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Combustion and rupture of a liquid oxygen tank during the Apollo 13 mission provides 
lessons and insights for future spacecraft designers and operations personnel who may 
never, during their careers, have participated in saving a vehicle and crew during a 
spacecraft emergency.  Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) challenges were the re-
establishment of attitude control after the oxygen tank incident, re-establishment of a free 
return trajectory, resolution of a ground tracking conflict between the LM and the Saturn V 
S-IVB stage, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) alignments, maneuvering to burn attitudes, 
attitude control during burns, and performing manual GNC tasks with most vehicle systems 
powered down.  Debris illuminated by the Sun and gaseous venting from the Service Module 
(SM) complicated crew attempts to identify stars and prevented execution of nominal IMU 
alignment procedures.  Sightings on the Sun, Moon, and Earth were used instead.  Near 
continuous communications with Mission Control enabled the crew to quickly perform time 
critical procedures.  Overcoming these challenges required the modification of existing 
contingency procedures.  
Figure 1. Apollo Command Service Module (CSM) (left) and Lunar Module (LM) (right).
T
I. Introduction
he Apollo 13 lunar mission was aborted after a short circuit in a Service Module (SM) oxygen tank           
caused combustion and tank rupture, resulting in extensive damage to SM systems and the loss of both SM        
.oxygen tanks.  This incident changed the mission objective from a lunar landing to crew survival and expeditious 
return to Earth.1-10 The loss of SM oxygen and power, as well as possible damage to the SM Service Propulsion 
System (SPS) prevented the use of Command Service Module (CSM) systems for crew survival and trajectory 
corrections required for return to Earth (Figure 1).  Lunar Module (LM) life support, power, and thermal control 
systems were required to keep the crew alive.  In addition, the LM Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) and    
.
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propulsion systems were used to perform trajectory adjustments and 
attitude maneuvers to control spacecraft thermal conditions.  The 
limited power and LM GNC software functionality required the use of 
previously developed or new contingency procedures that were labor 
intensive.  The ability of the crew and ground personnel to create, 
verify, and implement new contingency procedures and work-arounds 
in limited time was crucial to the safe return of the crew.  One
example was the adaption of square CSM lithium hydroxide (LiOH) 
canisters for use in the LM (the LM used round LiOH canisters) to 
remove carbon dioxide from the cockpit (Figure 2).  
After a mission abort was declared, four trajectory adjustment 
maneuvers were performed. The first placed the vehicle on a 
trajectory that would ensure return to Earth with appropriate trajectory 
conditions at Entry Interface (EI), that is, the arrival of the vehicle at 
an altitude 400,000 feet above an oblate earth, a point at which the       
.
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Figure 2. LiOH canister adapter in the LM.
vehicle enters the sensible atmosphere.  The second shortened the remaining flight time and moved the splashdown 
point from the Indian Ocean to the mid Pacific, the normal landing area for Apollo lunar missions.  The third and 
fourth maneuvers were small trajectory adjustments to meet required EI conditions. 
This paper contains an overview of the Apollo 13 nominal mission plan followed by a chronological 
description of GNC performance and mission activities.  Topics include a summary of the mission before the 
oxygen tank incident, GNC performance from the incident though LM activation, re-establishment of the free 
return to Earth trajectory, ground-based orbit determination, shortening the return trajectory, mid-course correction 
maneuvers, separation of the SM and LM, Mission Control preparation for entry and landing, entry and landing 
performance, and finally observations on GNC challenges.  Mission events are discussed in terms of Ground 
Elapsed Time, or GET.  The GET clock started at the integral second before lift-off, also called range zero. Range 
zero for the Apollo 13 mission was at 19:13:00 Greenwich Mean Time on Saturday, April 11, 1970. 
Table 1 lists key events during the mission.  Figure 3 illustrates the planned and as-flown timeline of key crew 
activities. Appendices A and B provide descriptions of the LM and CSM GNC capability.  Appendix C lists 
acronyms used in the paper.  
II. Apollo 13 Nominal Mission Plans
This section provides a summary of the nominal mission plan for Apollo 13.11 Topics include an overview of 
the mission and objectives, trans-lunar trajectory design, the post Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) S-IVB trajectory, 
nominal crew activities, lunar orbit insertion, lunar orbit and lunar surface activities, mid-course corrections, and 
re-entry.  Figure 4 is an illustration of the nominal mission trajectory.
A. Mission Overview
The April 1970 flight of Apollo 13 (Apollo mission H-2) was to be the third lunar landing of the Apollo 
Program.  The objective was exploration of the Fra Mauro uplands.  Apollo missions 11 and 12 had landed in “sea”
or mare areas, the Sea of Tranquility and the Ocean of Storms.13, 14
The primary crew was James A. Lovell (commander), Thomas K. Mattingly (Command Module or CM pilot), 
and Fred W. Haise (LM pilot).  The backup crew was John W. Young (commander), John L. Swigert (CM pilot), 
and Charles M. Duke (LM pilot).  Support crew members were Vance D. Brand, Jack R. Lousma, and William R. 
Pogue.13 Mission Control Flight Directors were Eugene F. Kranz (White Team), Glynn S. Lunney (Black Team), 
Gerald D. Griffin (Gold team), and Milton L. Windler (Maroon Team).15
The CSM and LM were named so that Mission Control could unambiguously communicate with crew 
members in each spacecraft.  CSM-109 was named Odyssey, while LM-7 was named Aquarius.  
B. Ascent and Low Earth Orbit
The nominal launch of Saturn V AS-508 was to occur on Saturday, April 11, 1970, at 2:13 pm Eastern
Standard Time (EST) from Launch Complex 39A.  The nominal mission plan included one and a half revolutions 
in low earth orbit.  Crew activities in low earth orbit included checkout of S-IVB and CSM systems.
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Event
TLI
MCC-1
MCC-2
MCC-3
Oxygen Tank 
Incident
DPS-1 
(MCC-4)
DPS-2 
(PC+2)
MCC-5
MCC-7
SM Sep
Undocking 
from LM
EI
Splashdown
Ground
Elapsed
Time
2:35:46
Planned for 
11:41:23 
30:40:50
Planned for
55:26:02
55:54:53
61:29:43.5 to
61:30:17.7
79:27:39.0 to
79:32:02.8
(PC+2 hours)
105:18:28.0 to
105:18:42.0
137:39:51.5 to
137:40:13.0
(EI-5 hours)
138:01:48
141:30:00
142:40:46
142:54:41
DV 
TGO
10,437.1 ft/sec
350.7 sec
23.1 ft/sec
3.37 sec
0.5 ft/sec
37.8 ft/sec
34.2 sec
860.5 ft/sec
263.8 sec
7.8 ft/sec
14.0 sec
3.0 ft/sec
21.5 sec
0.5 ft/sec
1.88 ft/sec CM A
0.65 ft/sec LM
Attitude 
Control for 
Maneuver to 
Burn Attitude
S-IVB
CSM RCS
LM RCS 
LM AGS for 
piloting cues.
LM RCS 
LM PGNS for 
piloting cues.
LM AGS cross 
check of PGNS.
LM RCS  
Earth AGS align.
AGS piloting cues.
LM RCS  
Earth AGS align.
AGS piloting cues.
PGNS for 
cross check.
Attitude 
Control 
for Burn
S-IVB
CSM 
PGNCS
LM PGNS
AUTO
LM PGNS
AUTO
LM AGS 
cross check 
of PGNS.
LM AGS for 
FDAI 
piloting 
cues. 
LM AGS for 
FDAI 
piloting 
cues.
Translational
Propulsion
S-IVB
CSM SPS
LM DPS
LM DPS
LM DPS
LM RCS
LM RCS
Docking tunnel 
air pressure.
Comments
Place vehicle on trans-
lunar free return 
trajectory.
Not performed.
Place vehicle on hybrid 
trajectory.
Not performed.
Place vehicle on free-
return trajectory for 
Indian Ocean landing.
AGS powered for 
monitoring and backup 
control.
Shorten return time 
and move landing 
point to the Pacific.
Steepen EI flight path 
angle to -6.52 deg.
Steepen EI flight path 
angle to -6.49 deg.
Followed by SM 
photos.
Arrival at 400,000 foot 
altitude.
3.5 nm from 
USS Iwo Jima
Table 1  Apollo 13 Key Events
A LM and CM separation was achieved by leaving the docking tunnel pressurized.  Neither the LM nor CM RCS systems were used.
AGS – LM Abort Guidance System, CM – Command Module, CSM – Command Service Module, DPS – Descent Propulsion System, DV –
Delta Velocity, EI – Entry Interface, FDAI – Flight Director Attitude Indicator, LM – Lunar Module, MCC – Mid-Course Correction, PC –
Pericynthion, PGNCS – CSM Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System, PGNS – LM Primary Guidance and Navigation Section, 
RCS – Reaction Control System, Sep – Separation, SM – Service Module, SPS – CSM Service Propulsion System, TGO – Time to Go, TLI –
Trans Lunar Injection, USS – United States Ship
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Figure 3. Apollo 13 Aborted Mission and Nominal Mission Timelines
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C. Apollo 13 Trans-Lunar Trajectory Design
Apollo missions 8, 10, and 11 flew free return trans-lunar trajectories.  The S-IVB TLI burn was targeted to 
place the vehicle on a translunar trajectory that would arrive at the moon with a 60 nm closest approach 
(pericynthion, or PC) altitude.  However, the TLI burn and resulting trajectory was also designed to return the 
spacecraft to the nominal Earth re-entry corridor if the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) maneuver was not performed.  
In the event of a SM SPS failure and normally expected trajectory dispersions, the SM Reaction Control System 
(RCS) could perform any Mid-Course Corrections (MCC) that were required to ensure acceptable Entry EI 
conditions (flight path angle and velocity magnitude at an altitude of 400,000 feet) for re-entry.16
Apollo 12 introduced a new cis-lunar trajectory technique, the hybrid free return. This technique was also flown 
by Apollo 13 (Figure 5).† The hybrid mission plan lowered the delta velocity requirements for LOI, increased 
payload mass, and increased LM hover time before landing through LOI propellant savings. More flexibility in 
landing site selection and larger launch windows with the required lunar landing site lighting were obtained.  
The S-IVB TLI maneuver was designed to place the vehicle on a free-return trajectory as was done for Apollo 
missions 8, 10, and 11.  On Apollo 13, this trajectory had a PC of 210 nm.  The later MCC-2 maneuver would place 
the vehicle on a non-free return trajectory with a PC of 59 nm.  This trajectory had an Earth perigee of 
approximately 2,500 nm, a value that would not result in atmospheric capture of the spacecraft and a safe re-entry.  
In the event of a mission contingency requiring return to Earth before LOI, a SM RCS burn could re-establish a 
circumlunar return trajectory with the appropriate vacuum perigee and EI conditions.  Once the spacecraft was in or 
near the lunar sphere of influence, the SPS or the LM Descent Propulsion System (DPS) was required to re-establish 
circumlunar return due to the size of the burn.  Departure from the free return trajectory at MCC-2 required the 
availability of the LM DPS as a backup to the CSM SPS.  
Two further MCC burns were scheduled to ensure that the trajectory conditions at the LOI point were 
acceptable.  MCC-3 was scheduled for LOI-22 hours and MCC-4 at LOI-5 hours.  If the MCC delta-velocity 
computed based on MSFN tracking data was small, a MCC burn may not be performed. 
A systems performance problem could require the crew to abort the mission and return to Earth.  Normally such 
burns would be computed by Mission Control.  In case an extended loss of communications occurred, Mission         
.
† Apollo 14 also flew a hybrid free return.  Apollo missions 15, 16, and 17 (the J missions) flew a modified free return.  TLI 
targeted the vehicle for the LOI pericynthion.  If the vehicle needed to return without entering lunar orbit, a burn could be 
executed at pericynthion to establish a return trajectory with appropriate EI conditions.   The modified free return required one 
less maneuver than the hybrid, was easier to plan for, required less propellant, provided more flexibility in landing site selection, 
and enabled the J series LM to carry more payload, such as the Lunar Rover.
Figure 4. Nominal Apollo 13 mission profile.12
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Control had supplied Apollo crews with burn data for abort burns at 25, 35, and 60 hours GET, as well as for LOI-5 
hours and PC+2 hours.  A back-up source of return to Earth abort burn data, when outside the lunar sphere of 
influence, was the Command Module Computer (CMC).  If a direct return to Earth was required (no lunar fly-by) 
the LM would be jettisoned before the burn.  Abort burns could also make use of the LM DPS and could involve a 
lunar fly-by.  Once the spacecraft entered the lunar sphere of gravitational influence a lunar fly-by provided a faster 
return to Earth than a direct return that did not include a lunar fly-by.  
D. Post TLI S-IVB Trajectory
During Apollo missions 8, 10, 11, and 12 the 
S-IVB stage was placed in heliocentric orbit using 
residual liquid oxygen dumped though the J-2 
engine for propulsion and a subsequent lunar 
gravity assist.  However, for Apollo 13 the S-IVB 
would be targeted for a lunar impact at a specified 
range from the Apollo 12 seismometer in an 
attempt to reproduce seismic phenomena observed 
during the Apollo 12 LM ascent stage impact 
(Figure 6).  The S-IVB would be tracked by the 
MSFN until impact.  Orbit determination data 
obtained using MSFN tracking would be used to 
target two mid-course corrections after the liquid 
oxygen dump, if they were required.  Impact was 
planned to occur approximately 20 minutes after 
the CSM/LM entered lunar orbit.
E. Nominal Crew Activities En Route to the Moon
After TLI the CSM nominally provides all GNC and propulsion functions during this phase of the mission.  
Crew activities include MCC burns to adjust the trajectory, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) alignments, horizon 
altitude and sextant trunnion bias determinations for back-up cis-lunar navigation, LM checkout, systems 
maintenance, fuel cell purges, waste water dumps, Earth photography, and public affairs events.  
S-IVB Trajectory
S-IVB Impact
(77:46 GET)
CSM/LM Trajectory
To Sun
To Earth
Figure 6. Planned Apollo 13 LOI burn and lunar S-IVB 
impact.11
LOI (77:25 GET)
Figure 5. Example of free return (pre MCC-2 burn) and hybrid (post MCC-2 burn) trajectories.12
The Apollo 13 non-free return Earth perigee was much smaller than the above at 2500 nm.
MCC-2 
Pre-MCC-2 free 
return trajectory.
Post-MCC-2 
non-free return 
trajectory.
80x103
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220x103
Longitudinal Distance (nm)
-20
-80
-40
0
40
-60
-20
20
60
La
te
ra
l D
is
ta
nc
e 
(n
m
)
TLI 
EI
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
7
Passive Thermal Control (PTC) rotation of the spacecraft, a roll about the longitudinal axis, is performed to 
control the thermal conditions of spacecraft systems and structure.  Three revolutions are performed per hour.  PTC 
rotation occurs during crew sleep periods and when other attitudes are not required.
F. Lunar Orbit and Lunar Surface Activities
Another departure from the Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 mission design was the combining of the second lunar 
orbit insertion burn (called LOI-2 on missions 11 and 12) with the Descent Orbit Insertion (DOI) burn.  On Apollo 
11 and 12 the LOI-1 burn placed the spacecraft in a 60 x 169 nm orbit.  Two revolutions later the LOI-2 maneuver 
placed the vehicle in a 54 x 66 nm orbit that would shift due to lunar gravity to a 60 nm altitude circular orbit at the 
time of LM rendezvous with the CSM.  The DOI burn, which occurred half revolution before landing, placed the 
LM in a 8 x 60 nm altitude orbit from which powered descent to the surface could take place.  
On Apollo 13 LOI was to place the spacecraft in an initial 57 x 168 nm altitude orbit.  Two revolutions later 
DOI would place the spacecraft in a 7 x 57 nm orbit that would shift over 12 revolutions, due to the gravitational 
field, to a 8.3 x 58.9 nm orbit by the time of Powered Descent Initiation (PDI).  Apollo 13 was to perform DOI 
using the SM SPS rather than the LM DPS, as had been done on previous missions.  The combined LOI-2/DOI 
maneuver would conserve enough propellant to provide an additional 15 seconds of LM hover time for landing.
The mission plan included a LM lunar surface stay of 33.5 hours, with landing occurring at 9:55 pm EST on 
Wednesday, April 15.  Lovell and Haise were to conduct two Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA), each of four hours 
duration.  Among many exploration activities was the deployment of a second Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment 
Package (ALSEP).  The first ALSEP was left on the lunar surface by the crew of Apollo 12 in November of 1969. 
While the LM was on the lunar surface the CM pilot was to perform science activities from lunar orbit.  This 
included detailed photography of potential landing sites for future Apollo missions.  Photography of Comet Bennett 
was also to be performed.  The CSM Very High Frequency (VHF) communications system was also to be used in a 
lunar VHF bistatic radar experiment, jointly with an Earth-based antenna.  
Lunar liftoff of Aquarius was planned to occur at 7:22 am EST on Friday, April 17.  The rendezvous was to be 
the same type of coelliptic profile flown on the previous Apollo missions.  
After crew and lunar sample transfer to the CSM, the CSM and the LM ascent stage were to separate.  Like 
Apollo 12, the LM ascent stage was to perform a deorbit burn targeted by Mission Control for lunar impact.  For 
Apollo 13 the targeted impact point was near the Apollo 13 landing site.  This was to provide data for the Apollo 13 
and Apollo 12 seismometers.  The Apollo 10 LM ascent stage was placed in a heliocentric orbit by burning the 
ascent stage propulsion system to propellant depletion.  The Apollo 11 LM ascent stage was left in lunar orbit and 
eventually impacted the lunar surface due to gravitational perturbations.  
The Trans-Earth Injection (TEI) maneuver was planned to occur after the CSM had been in lunar orbit for 
approximately 90 hours.  For the nominal mission plan the CSM was to leave lunar orbit at 1:42 pm EST on 
Saturday, April 18, 1970.  
G. Mid-Course Corrections and Entry
Three MCC burns were scheduled to ensure the appropriate trajectory conditions at EI.  MCC-5 was scheduled 
for TEI+15 hours, MCC-6 for EI-22 hours, and MCC-7 for EI-3 hours.  The burns were spaced to permit adequate 
MSFN tracking for ground navigation and for other factors.  On Apollo missions it was normal for MCC burns to 
be skipped if the computed delta-velocity was small.  
Nominal velocity magnitude at EI was 36,129 feet/second with a flight path angle of -6.5 degrees.  Range from 
EI to the landing site for a nominal entry trajectory was 1,250 nm.   For a Saturday, April 11, launch and nominal 
mission timeline, splashdown was scheduled to occur at 3:17 pm EST, Tuesday, April 21, in the Pacific about 180 
nm south of Christmas Island.  The amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima was the primary recovery ship.
III. Mission Summary Before the Oxygen Tank Incident 
This section provides an overview of the actual crew and GNC activities and performance from pre-launch 
through the oxygen tank incident.  Topics include the pre-launch crew change, launch and orbit insertion, low Earth 
orbit, TLI and the transposition and docking maneuver, IMU alignments and cis-lunar navigation, mid-course 
correction burns, and PTC attitude maneuvers.  GNC performance before the incident was nearly nominal, and the 
crew was ahead of the nominal flight plan up until the incident. Figure 7 illustrates key events on a reconstruction 
of the Apollo 13 trajectory.17
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A. Crew Change
Five days before the launch, on Monday, April 6, the flight surgeon recommended that Swigert replace 
Mattingly due to the possibility that Mattingly had contracted Rubella.  Swigert flew simulated contingency cases
with Lovell and Haise in a CSM simulator on Thursday, April 9.  Swigert’s replacement of Mattingly was agreed to 
by NASA management and the crew on the afternoon of Friday, April 10.13
B. Launch and Orbit Insertion
Lift-off occurred as planned on Saturday, April 11, 1970, at 2:13 pm EST.  The Saturn V S-II (second) stage 
Center Engine Cut-Off (CECO) occurred 132.36 seconds early, due to high amplitude low frequency oscillations in 
the engine and supporting structure.  The Iterative Guidance Mode (IGM) adjusted for the early shutdown during 
the remaining part of the second stage and during third stage.18 The remaining four S-II outboard engines fired 
34.53 seconds longer than the pre-mission prediction in response to the early CECO.  There were no flight control 
problems and subsequent S-II performance was nominal.  Under-speed at S-II Out-board Engine Cut-Off (OECO) 
was 223 feet/second.  
The third stage (S-IVB) burned 9.3 seconds longer than predicted. The targeted parking orbit was 100 nm 
circular, but the actual orbit was 98 x 100.2 nm with a 1.9 foot/second under-speed and a heading angle of 1.2 
degrees greater than the nominal value.  Orbit insertion time was 44 seconds later than planned.15, 19, 20
The early S-II CECO reduced the delta-velocity margin for the first TLI opportunity to about 295 feet/second, 
about half the normal margin for TLI.  However, delta-velocity margin was deemed acceptable and the crew was 
given a go for the first TLI opportunity by Mission Control.
C. Low Earth Orbit
Spacecraft systems checks were 
performed while in the parking orbit 
in preparation for TLI.  The Orbital 
Rate Display – Earth and Lunar 
(ORDEAL) unit was unstowed and 
installed.   The sextant optics cover 
was jettisoned while the optics were 
driven to point at the first star to be 
sighted.  The CM IMU platform 
alignment was successfully performed 
using the stars Spica and Antares.  The 
Crewman Optical Alignment Sight 
(COAS) was unstowed and installed, 
and the horizon check was successful 
(Figure 8).21, 22
Figure 7. As-flown Apollo 13 trajectory and key events.17
TLI
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Figure 8.  Crewman Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) in the Lunar Module 
(LM) commander’s window (left).  A similar COAS was installed in the 
Command Module (CM) left front window.  The LM COAS pattern is 
depicted at right.  The CM COAS pattern was similar, but not the same.
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D. TLI and the Transposition and Docking Maneuver
The IGM guided TLI burn was nominal.  After TLI the S-IVB maneuvered the stack to the transposition and 
docking attitude. Once this attitude was achieved the S-IVB maintained an inertial attitude hold.  Maximum 
spacecraft separation during the CSM Transposition and Docking maneuver was about 80 feet, with a CSM pitch 
rate during the maneuver of about 1.5 degrees/second.  The CM pilot reported that sunlight on the LM docking 
target washed out the COAS.  The COAS was therefore set at maximum brightness, making it difficult for the CM 
pilot to see the LM docking target.  Just before docking the CSM shadowed the LM docking target and target 
visibility was improved.  Closing rate at docking was about 0.2 feet/second. The docking and spring ejection of the 
LM/CSM from the S-IVB was nominal.21, 23
E. IMU Alignments and Cis-Lunar Optical Navigation
Five CM IMU alignments were successfully performed using the sextant in the CM.  Star pairs for each 
alignment were 1) Rasalhague and Enif, 2) Dnoces and Akaid, 3) Arcturus and Vega, 4) Menkent and Alphecca, 
and 5) Denebola and Alphecca.23
Two periods of sextant sightings were taken by the crew to estimate the Earth horizon bias and the sextant 
trunnion bias.  This data would have been used in the event an extended loss of communications with Mission 
Control forced the crew to perform on-board cis-lunar navigation to facilitate an autonomous return to Earth.  The 
bias determination was successful.22
F. Mid-Course Correction Burns
Three MCC burns were scheduled to occur before the oxygen tank incident (Table 1).  MCC-1, planned for 
execution at 11:41 GET, was canceled 3.5 hours after TLI due to nominal trajectory performance.  MCC-2, at 
30:40 GET, a 23.1 foot/second nearly retrograde burn, placed the spacecraft on the non-free return trajectory.  The 
CSM SPS was used for MCC-2.  The planned altitude of pericynthion was 60.22 nm, and a value of 60 nm was 
achieved by the burn.  The crew had secured the CM docking hatch and the docking probe and drogue in a CM 
crew couch using lap belt and shoulder harness restraints.  This prevented hardware movement during maneuvers.
MCC-3, scheduled for 55:26 GET, was canceled about 14 hours after MCC-2, as the MCC-4 maneuver was 
predicted to be only 4 feet/second.  Post TLI trajectory, up to the incident, was excellent.15, 24
Tropical storm Helen in the Pacific drove adjustment of the landing areas for 25, 35, and 60 hour GET abort 
opportunities to the east of the mid-Pacific recovery line.
G. Passive Thermal Control Attitude Maneuver
The first PTC roll was initiated about seven and a half hours into the mission.  Some difficulty was 
encountered in establishing the first PTC due to an error in the crew checklist and flight plan.  The PTC was later 
correctly initiated.  Four periods of PTC rotation were conducted before the incident.
H. S-IVB Trajectory
After the spring ejection of the CSM/LM stack, the S-IVB successfully performed an evasive maneuver using 
the Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) to reduce the risk of a collision with the CSM/LM.  Targeting the S-IVB for 
lunar impact near the Apollo 12 seismometer was accomplished through the use of a liquid hydrogen propulsive 
dump, a liquid oxygen vent, and an APS burn (Figure 6).  These activities were successfully performed.  
Subsequent tracking indicated that the S-IVB would impact in the target area on the lunar surface and no further 
APS burns were performed.  S-IVB telemetry and attitude control was lost at 19:34 GET.  At the time of the 
telemetry loss some unplanned delta-velocity was imparted to the S-IVB that actually improved the predicted 
impact point.  MSFN S-Band tracking of the S-IVB continued until lunar impact at 77:56:40 GET.20
IV. GNC Performance From the Oxygen Tank Incident Through Completion of LM Activation
During the period immediately following the incident the Apollo 13 crew and Mission Control conducted 
several time critical activities.  These included assessing CSM systems to determine which ones were viable and 
which ones were compromised, establishing and maintaining effective attitude control, activating the LM, and 
aligning the LM IMU platform to support future GNC activities necessary for crew return to Earth.  
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A. Cause of the Oxygen Tank Incident
The post-flight investigation determined that a failure of the SM oxygen tank #2 thermostatic switches 
damaged Teflon insulation located near fan motor wires.  During the oxygen tank stirring (a nominal procedure) the 
fan motor wiring short circuited, causing combustion in the oxygen tank.  The release of oxygen under high 
pressure from the tank blew the panel covering SM bay four off of the vehicle, caused a leak in the oxygen tank #1 
system, damaged the high gain antenna, and caused other damage to the SM (Figure 1).  The loss of oxygen from 
both tanks and the loss of power generated by the fuel cells that use oxygen prompted Mission Control to declare a 
mission abort.25
B. GNC Impact of the Oxygen Tank Combustion
The integrating accelerometers in the CM IMU indicated that a velocity increment of approximately 0.5 
feet/second was imparted to the spacecraft at a time between 55:54:53 and 55:54:55 GET.  Doppler tracking data 
from the MSFN measured an incremental velocity component of 0.26 feet/second, along a line-of-sight from the 
Earth to the spacecraft at approximately 55:54:55 GET.
For about one hour and 45 minutes after the incident the crew and Mission Control focused on resolving the 
CSM electrical problems, re-establishing attitude control using the CSM GNC system and RCS, and attempting to 
halt the loss of oxygen from the SM.  Oxygen venting into space was observed by the crew.  The oxygen quickly 
disappeared, but a large amount of small particle debris surrounded the spacecraft.  Crew control of attitude using 
the SM RCS jets was initially successful, but eventually the spacecraft began to drift in attitude, SM RCS propellant 
consumption increased, and omni communications antenna switching occurred.  The crew reported that venting 
induced negative rates in pitch and roll.  Changes were made to the SM RCS configuration in an attempt to reduce 
propellant consumption.  Avoiding CM IMU platform gimbal lock while maintaining a stable attitude was a 
challenge.  In the first 39 minutes after the incident approximately 70 lbs of SM RCS propellant was used for 
attitude control.  Approximately 45 minutes after the incident, vehicle attitude had stabilized and venting had 
apparently stopped.15
C. LM Activation
Efforts to save the remaining oxygen tank failed and by 57:35 GET the crew had entered the LM to begin 
activating LM systems required for crew survival such as power, life support, communications, and GNC.  The 
crew used the LM activation checklist to power-up systems considered to have the highest priority.  Mission 
Control personnel facilitated the activation of LM systems at a pace faster than could have been achieved if the 
crew used the activation checklist without ground assistance.  The LM activation checklist was not normally 
performed until the spacecraft was in lunar orbit. 
Fortunately, communications was maintained during this period and high bit rate telemetry was obtained 
through the 210 foot MSFN antenna at Goldstone, CA.15 Later the establishment of MSFN communications with 
the LM was complicated by the use of the same frequency by the S-IVB S-Band transponder and the LM S-Band 
system.  This issue was eventually resolved (see Section VI, Ground Based Orbit Determination, for a description 
of this problem).
The CM Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System (PGNCS) was left powered as long as possible 
while other CM systems were shut down.  A controlled CM power-down was completed by 58:40 GET.  The CM 
switches were placed in a known configuration to facilitate future procedure development by the crew and Mission 
Control personnel. 
During this time there was a period (~2.5 minutes) when the spacecraft was not under active attitude control.  
Attitude control was re-established as soon as the condition was recognized.1,15 Concerns about LM water 
consumption for LM Primary Navigation and Guidance System (PGNS) cooling led flight controllers to examine 
use of the Abort Guidance Section (AGS) to maintain an attitude reference while keeping the PGNS powered down 
until it was required.
D. LM Platform Alignment
During LM activation IMU platform alignment was a top priority so that the LM could be used to perform 
burns to place the spacecraft on a return to Earth trajectory.  Aligning the LM platform before the CM platform 
alignment was lost, due to the CM power-down, was a challenge.  LM PGNS activation was nominal.  
A CM to LM docked alignment was performed.  The CM pilot provided CM IMU gimbal angles to the 
commander for the docked LM alignment.  The procedure required some pencil and paper calculations and the       
..
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commander asked Mission Control to do the math to ensure accuracy.  The crew reported that debris surrounding 
the spacecraft made it impossible to recognize constellations needed to perform a CM IMU or LM IMU optical 
alignment using star sightings.
V. Re-Establishment of the Return to Earth Trajectory
After the incident, it became apparent that the lunar landing could not be accomplished due to the loss of 
oxygen in the SM and that the spacecraft trajectory must be altered for a return to Earth.  At the time of the 
incident, the spacecraft was on a non-free return trajectory with an Earth perigee of approximately 2500 nm that 
precluded a re-entry and splashdown.  Lunar pericynthion was 62 nm.  Once the LM was activated and CM power-
down was complete, Mission Control and supporting personnel focused attention on developing a return to Earth 
trajectory plan.
A. Maneuver Targeting
Targeting and orbit determination for trajectory maneuvers performed in transit to and from the Moon were 
normally performed by Mission Control.  In the event of an extended communications outage, the crew could 
perform an autonomous return using the CMC Return to Earth Targeting Program and the Cis-Lunar Mid-Course 
Navigation Program.  However, due to the loss of SM power these backup navigation and targeting functions were 
unavailable.  Fortunately, adequate communications between the spacecraft and Earth were maintained for most of 
the mission.  As with a nominal Apollo lunar mission, Mission Control computed all Apollo 13 cis-lunar trajectory 
burns and performed all precision orbit determination using tracking data from the MSFN. 
B. Direct Return to Earth 
Soon after the incident Mission Control personnel examined direct return to Earth aborts that did not include a 
lunar fly-by.  These burns had to be performed with the SM SPS before ~61 hours GET, when the spacecraft 
entered the lunar sphere of gravitational influence.  Landings in both the Pacific and Atlantic could be made.
A direct return to Earth (no lunar fly-by) with a landing at 118 hours GET could only be accomplished by 
jettisoning the LM and performing a 6,079 foot/second SM SPS burn (Table 2).  Abort maneuver data for this burn 
was already on-board the spacecraft as a part of normal mission procedures.  However, this option was 
unacceptable due to possible damage to the SPS and the necessity of using LM systems and consumables (power, 
water, oxygen, etc.) for crew survival.15
C. Options for DPS-1
Return to Earth planning assumed use of the LM DPS and RCS, a lunar fly-by, and that the SM SPS would 
only be used as a last resort. Table 2 lists the direct return and PC+2 burn options examined at this point in the 
mission.15  Several options (not in Table 2) for the DPS-1 burn were debated.  DPS-1 was designed to re-establish 
the free return trajectory to Earth. During this period of high activity by ground personnel some confusion existed 
over the DPS-1 requirements, such as minimum delta-velocity, fastest return time, water or land landing.  
A decision was made to execute a maneuver expeditiously to place the spacecraft back on a free return 
trajectory.  The LM PGNS was powered and the current IMU alignment was of sufficient accuracy to support DPS-
1.  If the burn was delayed there was a concern that the PGNS alignment could degrade.  The transfer time could 
then be shortened with a later burn at pericynthion+2 (PC+2) hours (Table 2) to ensure that landing occurred while 
the LM had sufficient oxygen, water, power, and RCS propellant. 
The DPS-1 option with the lowest delta-velocity was a 17 foot/second burn that would result in a land landing 
in Madagascar, if no subsequent maneuvers were performed.  This option was dismissed.24 A larger burn (37.8 
feet/second) could be executed to achieve an Indian Ocean landing at approximately 152 hours GET.  Another 
option was to wait until PC+2 at about 79:30 hours GET (after the lunar fly-by) to place the spacecraft on a return 
trajectory (Table 2).  
It was decided to target DPS-1 for an Indian Ocean landing south of Mauritius at 152 hours GET.  Advantages 
of this option included: 1) A water landing if no subsequent burns could be performed, and 2) A reduction in flight 
time by several hours.  LM consumables would be evaluated in an attempt to keep the LM PGNS and AGS 
powered until after the PC+2 burn.  DPS-1 would result in a pericynthion altitude of 135 nm.24 However, the 
landing area for a backup entry piloting technique in the event of both PGNCS and Entry Monitoring System            
.
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Scenario
Direct
Return
Burn
PC+2 burn, no 
previous DPS-1 
burn to 
re-establish 
free return.
PC+2 burn with 
DPS-1 burn to 
reestablish 
free return.
TIG 
(GET)
60:00
60:00
79:30
79:30
79:30
79:30
79:30
79:30
79:30
DV
6079 ft/sec
10,395 ft/sec
670 ft/sec
4657 ft/sec
1798 ft/sec
854 ft/sec
4836 ft/sec
1997 ft/sec
1452 ft/sec
Splashdown
Location
21:05 S latitude
153 W longitude
26:13 S latitude
165 W longitude
11:35 S latitude
165 W longitude
28:26 S latitude
165 W longitude
22:48 S latitude
25 W longitude
21:38 S latitude
165 W longitude
12:24 S latitude
165 W longitude
23:21 S latitude
25 W longitude
22:16 S latitude
86:40 W longitude
GET of 
Splashdown
118:12
94:15
142:47
118:07
133:15
142:47
118:12
133:15
137:27
Weather
Good
Good
Good
Good
Very Good
Good
Good
Very Good
OK
Recovery Ships
USS Iwo Jima
USS Iwo Jima
USS Iwo Jima
USS Iwo Jima
Some Ships
Available 
USS Iwo Jima
USS Iwo Jima
Some Ships
Available 
None
Table 2  Abort Options Considered Before DPS-1 Burn Execution 15
Splashdown
Ocean
Mid Pacific
Mid Pacific
Mid Pacific
Mid Pacific
Atlantic
Mid Pacific
Mid Pacific
Atlantic
Eastern 
Pacific
DV – Delta Velocity, GET – Ground Elapsed Time, PC – Pericynthion, TIG – Time of Ignition, USS – United States Ship
(EMS) failures (a constant 4g roll to the right entry, see the EMS entry in Appendix B) during entry contained an 
island.  If the PC+2 burn was not executed and the failures occurred the crew would have flown a constant 4g roll 
to the left entry.15
D. SM Jettison Option
At this point there was also discussion of jettisoning the SM since all the oxygen had vented into space.  A 
faster return (landing at ~118 to 119 hours GET) could be achieved by jettisoning the SM before the PC+2 
maneuver (Table 3).  Before DPS-1 the LM DPS total delta-velocity available was 1,994 feet/second with the SM 
attached and 4,830 feet/second if the SM was jettisoned.  However, speeding up the return would require most of 
the LM DPS propellant. Analysis was performed to determine if a DPS burn could be performed after a SM jettison 
with the CM attached to the LM (a LM/CM configuration).  Computer simulations indicated there were no               
.
TIG 
(GET)
78:30
PC+1
79:30
PC+2
79:30
PC+2
DV
4728 ft/sec
845 ft/sec
1997 ft/sec
GET of 
Splashdown
118
142
133
MCC-5 DV at 105 GET for
1 Degree PC+2 Attitude Error
~87 ft/sec
~22 ft/sec
~50 ft/sec
SM Jettison 
Before PC+2
Yes
No
No
Table 3  PC+2 Burn Options Considered After DPS-1 15
DV – Delta Velocity, GET – Ground Elapsed Time, PC – Pericynthion, TIG – Time of Ignition
Ocean
Mid Pacific
Mid Pacific
Atlantic
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problems with a DPS maneuver for a LM/CM configuration.  DPS gimbal trim angles were computed for the 
LM/CM configuration.
However, it was decided to keep the SM attached to the CM until just before entry for the following four 
reasons: 1) The SM SPS and SM RCS could still be fired using the CM entry batteries, 2) Digital Auto-Pilot (DAP) 
problems (flight control) may exist without the SM attached, 3) The LM had sufficient lifetime (~140 hours) to 
support a return, and 4) Heat shield exposure to low temperatures for a long period and internal CM thermal 
problems could arise if the SM were jettisoned too early.  
Figure 9. Lunar Module Flight Director 
Attitude Indicator (FDAI).
Figure 10. Lunar Module Thrust/Translation 
Controller Assembly (TTCA).
Figure 11. Lunar Module Attitude 
Controller Assembly (ACA).
E. DPS-1 Execution
DPS-1 was performed with the LM DPS and the LM PGNS. A DPS firing with the LM docked to the CSM was 
first performed in low Earth orbit during the Apollo 9 mission (March 1969) to test the DPS backup capability for 
the SPS.26 For the maneuver to burn attitude the crew used Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI) error needles 
driven by the AGS as cues (Figure 9). The Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly (TTCA, Figure 10) was used for 
roll and pitch control, and the Attitude Controller Assembly (ACA, Figure 11) for yaw. The ACA was normally 
used for manual attitude control during LM only flight.  However, use of the TTCA for pitch and roll control was 
required since it provided more pitch and roll control authority than the ACA when the LM RCS was used to control 
the docked CSM/LM spacecraft with a fully loaded SM.  Once the attitude error needles were nulled, PGNS attitude 
control (Figure 12) was placed in the automatic mode.  Figure 13 shows the location of this hardware in the LM.
Before the DPS-1 burn a 10 second ullage burn was performed with the LM RCS.  Manual crew throttling of 
the DPS engine was performed.  Thrust levels were 5 seconds at 12.6% thrust followed by 27 seconds at 40% thrust.  
DPS-1 at ~61:30 GET was successful and the crew reported that attitude excursions during the burn were 
minimal.21
Figure 12. Lunar Module Display and Keyboard (DSKY).
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Figure 13.  Lunar Module commander’s station.  The pilot’s station (to the right, not shown) was also 
equipped with a TTCA, ACA, and FDAI.
Window with Landing 
Point Designator 
(LPD, see Figure 16).
Flight 
Director 
Attitude 
Indicator 
(FDAI, see
Figure 9)
Alignment 
Optical 
Telescope 
(AOT, see 
Figure 14)
Docking Window
Display and 
Keyboard 
(DSKY, see
Figure 12)
Attitude Controller 
Assembly (ACA,
see Figure 11)
Thrust/Translation Controller 
Assembly (TTCA, see Figure 10)
Crewman Optical Alignment 
Sight (COAS) mounted here 
(not shown, see Figure 8).
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After DPS-1 was successfully performed the LM was partially powered down to conserve power and water.  
The PGNS remained on to support the PTC rotation and to provide a platform reference for the PC+2 burn.  
An attempt was made to manually place the stack in a PTC rotation. The FDAI units were powered off after 
DPS-1 and the crew monitored attitude using IMU gimbal angles shown on the LM PGNS computer display for 
piloting cues (Figure 12).  The crew found this procedure and avoiding gimbal lock to be challenging as it had not 
been practiced in training.  
By 63:50 GET difficulty in initiating the PTC rotation led to a different PTC procedure.  The spacecraft was 
manually maneuvered 90 degrees in yaw (LM body frame) once an hour. Since the spacecraft yaw axis was not 
aligned with the IMU platform yaw axis, a pitch or roll command from the TTCA could cause a change in both of 
the corresponding digital gimbal angle displays.  This complicated attempts to avoid gimbal lock of the middle 
gimbal.  Vehicle attitude was changed to more closely align the platform and body yaw axes.  This made the 
piloting task easier.21, 23 Later the crew placed tape on the top and side of each FDAI and wrote notes on the tape 
correlating TTCA deflections with desired spacecraft pitch and roll rotations.21
Propellant use with the 1.4 degree attitude error deadband was too high at ~1% per hour.  A new attitude error 
deadband value of 5 degrees was determined using ground simulations.  All LM +X jets (downward firing) were 
disabled since the LM plume deflectors were nullifying the effective +X RCS thrust and increasing propellant 
consumption. 
F. Recovery Preparations
By 58:26 GET, Mission Control recovery operations personnel had been tasked to evaluate four landing points 
for possible use on the mid-Pacific, Atlantic, eastern Pacific, and Indian Ocean recovery lines.  Landing times for 
these points were 142, 133, 137, and 152 hours GET.  Weather personnel evaluated weather forecasts for the 
potential landing points, and the U.S. Department of Defense identified which naval and merchant ships in those 
areas might be available to assist with crew and spacecraft recovery.  Offers of assistance and use of aircraft, 
airfields, and ships were received from many foreign governments. 
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In the event of an Indian Ocean landing (targeted by the DPS-1 burn), the destroyer USS Bordelon would 
perform the recovery.  The Bordelon was in Port Louis, Mauritius.  A U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter was placed on 
standby to fly a recovery crane and a NASA advisor to Mauritius, if needed.  Three other U.S. destroyers were also 
available in the Indian Ocean.  The aircraft carrier USS America, scheduled to cruise to Rio de Janerio, left Puerto 
Rico early to cover a possible Atlantic landing.15 
By 66:14 GET, three landing points in the mid-Pacific were under consideration.  The USS Iwo Jima was 
positioned to be within range of all three points.  
VI. Ground Based Orbit Determination
The power-down of the CSM required the power-up of the LM Unified S-Band (USB) transponder for 
communications and tracking.  However, this resulted in interference with the S-IVB Instrumentation Unit (IU) 
Command and Communication System (CCS).  Both the LM USB and the IU CCS used the same S-Band 
frequency.  Power-on of the LM transponder was not scheduled to occur until after S-IVB lunar impact and after 
the CSM/LM had entered lunar orbit (Figure 6).  Use of the same frequencies by both vehicles complicated tracking 
in the first 6 hours after the incident. 
The first attempt to correct the problem used a modified version of a previously developed procedure.  The IU 
CCS frequency was offset below the center carrier frequency, and the LM USB frequency was offset above the 
center carrier frequency.  However, the Real Time Computer Complex (RTCC) supporting Mission Control           
reported that LM tracking data was unusable at this frequency.  The second work-around was to re-set the LM 
frequency to the center carrier frequency by turning off the LM USB transponder for 5 minutes.  The IU CCS 
frequency was offset to a new value below the center carrier frequency.  Tracking of the LM was re-established and 
the data was usable.  Later investigation revealed that RTCC personnel could have made computer inputs to correct 
the first work-around resulting in usable LM tracking data.15
To conserve LM power, a proposal was made to periodically turn off the LM USB transponder. A tracking plan 
was developed to support the proposed transponder power-down.  However, the available power level permitted the 
transponder to remain on for the rest of the mission.  Continuous S-Band tracking made it easier for the ground 
navigation team to maintain knowledge of tracking data quality and trajectory determination performance through 
normal procedures compared to the use of intermittent coverage. 
An amplifier was turned off to conserve power. Consequently, less range data was received than normal, but 
trajectory determination accuracy in support of MCC-7 was equivalent to that achieved on other flights.  Spacecraft 
maneuvers to establish PTC rotation caused glitches observed in Doppler tracking data.27
For the first 10 hours after the incident orbit determination was complicated by an orbit determination process 
restart and a lack of range measurements.  An indication of the accuracy of subsequent ground tracking was the 
prediction of loss and acquisition of signal times when the spacecraft passed behind the Moon and later emerged.  
The crew reported that the actual times agreed with the predicted times supplied by Mission Control.21
VII. Shortening the Return to Earth
After DPS-1 the spacecraft was on a return trajectory to an Indian Ocean landing.  However, extending the 
viability of the LM power and life support systems until EI was a challenge.  Shortening the return time would 
provide power and life support margin needed for crew survival. In addition, few recovery forces were available to 
ensure crew rescue after an Indian Ocean landing.  A landing on the Mid-Pacific recovery line was preferred since 
more recovery forces were available there.
A. Spacecraft Status
After DPS-1 the projected LM power profile improved and the PGNS was kept powered until after the next 
burn at PC+2 hours.  The PGNS would then be powered down as part of a plan to only power the life support and 
communications systems.  By 63:32 GET, Mission Control and other personnel were working on a plan to use CM 
lithium hydroxide canisters in the LM to remove carbon dioxide from the cabin (Figure 2).  A power amplifier was 
powered off to save power, but this resulted in background noise during air-to-ground communications.  Mission 
Control recommended keeping one crew member on duty at all times while the other two rested.
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B. DPS-2 Options
The second maneuver, DPS-2, at PC+2 hours was planned to reduce the transit time.   DPS-2 options are in 
Table 3.  There was sufficient time after DPS-1 for Mission Control to assess the lifetime of LM consumables and 
choose a landing time and a PC+2 burn option.  The option chosen had a delta-velocity of ~850 feet/second and 
targeted the CM for a splashdown in the mid-Pacific at ~143 hours GET.  This option provided approximately 13 
hours of margin in spacecraft consumables.  Lower sensitivity of the ~850 foot/second DPS-2 to burn attitude error 
and the availability of a post-burn speed-up maneuver were also factors.  In the event of a partially executed DPS-2 
the desired landing site could not be achieved but acceptable trajectory conditions at EI could be attained to ensure 
a safe entry.  For a partially executed ~850 foot/second PC+2 the appropriate entry corridor conditions at EI could 
have been achieved with a mid-course maneuver of 4 feet/second or less.  For the 4728 foot/second PC+2 option a 
partial burn required a subsequent mid-course correction as large as 200 feet/second to achieve acceptable EI 
conditions.15, 24
It was preferred for the CM to land in the water, as opposed to land.  However, there was a possibility that a 
partial DPS-2 burn followed by a MCC-5 maneuver could result in a land landing in Australia.  Mission Planning 
and Analysis Division (MPAD) personnel conducted a study to determine if land areas could be avoided using entry 
guidance ranging.  The study determined that for a partial burn of between 300 and 450 feet/second, land areas 
could not be avoided for an entry range of less than 2500 nm, the maximum Apollo entry ranging requirement.   
If DPS-2 was not executed at PC+2 hours, a PC+4 hour burn was also computed to achieve a Pacific landing at 
~143 hours GET.  Delta-velocity for this burn was 23.1 feet/second higher than the PC+2 burn.
Other options for targeting the DPS-2 maneuver were discussed.  The first involved a SM SPS burn to achieve 
a landing in the Pacific at 118 hours GET.  This was ruled out due to uncertainty about the integrity of the SM 
structure and the SPS. 
A second option was to jettison the SM and perform an approximately 4,382 feet/second DPS burn to achieve a 
Pacific landing at ~118 hours GET.  This was rejected since it required burning the DPS close to propellant 
depletion, the CM heat shield would be exposed to an extended period of cold soak, and any errors in LM platform 
alignment could result in large MCC burns later in the return trajectory.  A partial DPS-2 burn could result in a 
MCC-5 of 175 feet/second.
The third option for DPS-2 was to skip it and later perform an MCC burn to ensure an Indian Ocean landing at 
~152 hours GET.  This option was rejected since the flight time would come close to exhausting LM consumables 
and there were fewer recovery forces available in the Indian Ocean as compared to the mid-Pacific.  
A fourth option was to use abort burn data already verbally communicated to the crew at 59 hours GET.  This 
option had been verbally communicated to the crew as a part of standard mission procedure to ensure return to 
Earth capability in the event of an extended loss of communication.  This ~1,988 foot/second burn with the SM still 
attached would achieve a landing in the Atlantic Ocean at ~133 hours GET (Table 3).  However, this option would 
burn the DPS close to propellant depletion.  MCC-5 delta-velocity for a partial DPS-2 was 25 feet/second.
C. IMU Alignment Before DPS-2
After DPS-1, once the PTC rotation had been established and had stabilized, LM IMU alignment options in 
preparation for DPS-2 were examined.  One option was a platform alignment while the spacecraft was in the 
shadow of the Moon. Since a 1 degree attitude error at DPS-2 had a small impact on delta-velocity of later MCC 
burns, the required LM IMU alignment accuracy was relaxed and a Sun check of alignment was deemed 
adequate.15 An Earth-Sun alignment could check the current alignment or be used to re-align the IMU.  The 
Alignment Optical Telescope (AOT, Figure 14) would be used, but the rendezvous radar antenna would have to be 
rotated out of the AOT field of view.  The CM sextant could also be used to check the alignment.
It was decided to perform a LM platform alignment check at 74 hours GET using a Sun sighting through the 
AOT.  Mission Control provided a Sun vector for the PGNS.  The PGNS would point the AOT at the Sun as if 
marks were to be taken for an IMU alignment.  If Sun angles indicated platform alignment was sufficient for the 
burn, then no re-alignment would be required.  An alignment accuracy of +/-1 degree was determined to be 
acceptable for DPS-2.  Otherwise, a Sun-Earth platform alignment would be performed before the spacecraft passed 
behind the Moon.  This would be followed by a rough alignment check using an AOT star sighting while the 
spacecraft was in the shadow of the Moon.  The rendezvous radar was rotated out of the AOT field of view and the 
Sun check indicated a platform alignment of 0.5 degrees.  A subsequent Sun-Earth alignment was not required.15
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
17
The crew discovered after the incident that spacecraft debris made it difficult to perform AOT star sightings to 
check LM IMU alignment.  However, the crew later reported that while the spacecraft was in the Moon's shadow a 
star alignment could have been performed.21
D. DPS-2 Execution
Mission Control provided the crew with six DPS-2 mission rules based on tight performance limits.  The DPS 
engine was to be shut down if any of the rules were violated since the spacecraft was already on a return to Earth 
trajectory.  If a pre-mature shutdown occurred the DPS would be re-ignited if the shutdown was not due to violation 
of the six mission rules.
If DPS-2 was not executed the trajectory could remain targeted for an Indian Ocean landing at 152 hours GET.  
MCC-5, with a predicted delta-velocity of ~4 feet/second, would be performed at 93 hours GET. If a partial DPS-2 
burn occurred (early DPS shutdown) a MCC burn would be required at PC + 4 hours.  If DPS-2 was delayed, a burn 
with a delta-velocity 24 feet/second larger than DPS-2 would be performed at PC+4 hours to achieve a Pacific 
landing at ~143 hours GET.  DPS-2 maneuver ignition time was not critical.15
The PTC maneuver was stopped at 76:16 GET and a coarse AOT sighting was successfully performed on 
Nunki to verify that IMU platform alignment was still acceptable for DPS-2.  AOT (Figure 15) and LM window 
(Figure 16) views for the DPS-2 burn attitude were determined by Mission Control for use by the crew as an 
attitude check. The Moon was on the 14 degree mark of the Landing Point Designator (LPD) in the commander’s 
window (Figure 16). The AGS was used to cross check the PGNS. The TTCA was used to manually control roll 
and pitch and the ACA was used for yaw. Once the crew achieved the burn attitude by observing the FDAI error 
needles the PGNS automatically held the burn attitude.  
After the maneuver to the burn attitude was completed a second coarse AOT star check on Nunki was 
performed, and platform alignment was still acceptable.  This second check occurred soon after the spacecraft 
entered the shadow of the Moon at approximately 76:42 GET.  Loss of signal due to the spacecraft passing behind 
the Moon lasted from about 77:09 to 77:34 GET.  
LM power-up for DPS-2 began at 78:12 GET.  The crew maneuvered to the burn attitude at 79:17 GET.  The 
burn was executed automatically by the PGNS.  The DPS throttle profile was 5 seconds at 12.6% thrust, 21 seconds 
at 40% thrust, and 235 seconds at maximum thrust.  The crew was postured to provide backup commanding during 
the burn if it was required.  Ignition of the 860.5 foot/second burn occurred at 79:27:38 GET and it was successful. 
E. Post DPS-2 PTC Rotation
After PC+2 the LM was partially powered down.  The PGNS and RCS remained powered to support 
establishment of the PTC rotation in LM yaw.  A procedure was devised to maneuver to the PTC attitude with the 
RCS in minimum impulse to conserve propellant.  A manual maneuver was performed since data from LM 
simulators at the Kennedy Space Center (Florida) and the Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston) indicated that a 
PGNS auto maneuver to the PTC attitude would require more time and propellant to dampen rotational rates.  
Figure 14. Lunar Module Alignment Optical Telescope (AOT) fields of view.  
The forward viewing position illustrated in both the top and side views was the 
only one used during Apollo 13.  Axes are the same as those shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 15. DPS-2 (PC+2) burn Alignment Optical 
Telescope (AOT) view.28
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Figure 16. DPS-2 (PC+2) burn LM commander’s window 
view with Landing Point Designator (LPD) scale.28
ACRUX
MENKENT
GIENAH
ALPHARD
REGULUS
DENEBOLA
JUPITER
MOON•• •
•
•
10
10
10
10 5
5
10
20
30
40
50
60
5
5
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• • •
•
•
•
•
18
The PTC attitude was difficult to achieve due to the small moment arm in the LM pitch and roll axes.  
Furthermore, the large yaw angle (outer IMU gimbal) caused roll commands to cross couple into pitch.  Some 
pieces of debris from the SM were sighted by the crew at this time.15 After the problem was recognized the crew 
zeroed the LM yaw angle and maneuvered to the PTC attitude in LM roll and LM pitch.  Once the PTC rotation 
was established the LM Guidance Computer (LGC) and IMU were powered down.  The IMU heater remained 
powered as was the RCS direct crew attitude control capability.
The PTC rotation did not remain stable.  The Earth and Moon moved horizontally as viewed through the LM 
commander and pilot windows.  The crew provided Mission Control with the angles where the Earth and Moon 
crossed the LPD in the commander LM window (Figure 16).  This enabled Mission Control to roughly monitor 
spacecraft rotational dynamics even though telemetry was not available due to the LM power-down.  Half-cone 
angles of up to 40 degrees occurred during the rotation.  However, off-nominal rotation during PTC was deemed 
acceptable as long as it did not degrade air-to-ground communications.
VIII. Mid-Course Correction Maneuvers
Three opportunities for transearth course corrections were routinely scheduled, on Apollo 13 as for other 
missions, as discrete opportunities for adjusting the trajectory to achieve the desired Entry Interface conditions 
including the flight path angle (the angle between the direction the vehicle is traveling and the local horizontal 
plane).  The desired value of the entry flight path angle was -6.5 degrees.  The corridor of acceptable flight path 
angles was from -5.25 degrees to -7.4 degrees.
Processing of MSFN tracking data from two hours past pericynthion passage to after the MCC-5 burn showed 
a consistent trend of shallow values in the predicted flight path angle at EI.  No MCC-6 was executed but it was 
necessary to adjust for post MCC-5 perturbations by executing MCC-7.  An exact cause of the trend was not 
determined.  However, crew reports of a constant stream of particles visible through the windows indicated a 
possible persistent vent.  Use of the LM sublimator for thermal control during periods of LM power-up was also a 
possible source of propulsive venting.  In addition, all attitude maneuvers were performed using the LM RCS jets.  
Ground personnel reasoned that one or all of these could have been responsible for the undesirable trend in 
predicted flight path angle at EI.15
A. Possible Weather Avoidance Burn
At approximately 90 hours GET, the weather in the recovery area was good, but there was some uncertainty 
about the forecast for the recovery day.  A weather avoidance burn to change the landing site to avoid the forecast   
.
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weather was considered.  Weather avoidance burns were radial delta-velocity maneuvers.  The PGNS would be 
required for the maneuver to burn attitude since the COAS in the LM commander window could not be pointed at 
the Earth to serve as an attitude reference as it could be for posigrade and retrograde burns (Figures 8, 17, and 18).  
However, sufficient maneuvering could be performed during entry by the CM PGNCS entry guidance to achieve a 
landing point with more favorable weather.  A weather avoidance burn was not performed.
B. Planning for MCC-5
DPS-2 had been confirmed as a successful maneuver yielding an EI flight path angle of -7.11 degrees and a 
corresponding vacuum perigee of 11.2 nm.  This confirmation was based on the applied change in velocity as 
measured by the LM IMU.  However, Mission Control orbit determination using MSFN data after DPS-2 indicated 
a vacuum perigee of 78.9 nm, too high a value for a successful re-entry to occur.24
The first correction burn, MCC-5, was moved from 118 hours GET to ~104 hours GET to permit more post 
MCC-5 tracking by the MSFN.  Mission Control was confident in the ephemeris accuracy for both the 104 hours 
GET and 118 hours GET MCC-5 options.  An additional consideration was the anticipated rupture of the 
supercritical Helium burst disk in the LM.  The vent would impart a delta-velocity to the trajectory, and it was 
desired for the vent to occur after MCC-5, while the AGS was still powered, and while a PTC rotation was not in 
progress. Analysis indicated that the vent would likely occur between 105 hours and 108 hours GET.  There was 
also a desire to minimize the length of time the AGS was powered.
After 95 hours GET, a procedure to power the CSM from the LM was read up to the crew.  Mission Control 
wanted this procedure to be on-board in case there was a loss of communications with the LM.  At 100 hours GET, 
the MCC-5 burn procedure was read up to the crew by Mission Control.
C. Maneuvers to Burn Attitude
After the execution of DPS-1, personnel began investigating methods for attitude alignment for the PC+2 and 
subsequent MCC burns in case the PGNS was not powered or unavailable.  One result of this investigation was the 
previously mentioned use of the Moon position on the LPD scale in the commander’s window to verify the PC+2 
burn attitude (Figure 16).  In addition, methods were identified for attitude alignment to a previously determined 
inertial attitude.  These methods, using the Earth terminator in the COAS (Figure 8) and the Sun in the AOT (Figure 
14), had originally been developed during contingency development for the Apollo 8 mission.  An advantage of 
these procedures was that while the crew had difficulty discerning stars due to venting and debris, the Earth and 
Sun were easy to observe.  The Apollo 13 crew stated after the mission that these procedures were easy to 
perform.21
To correct a shallow flight path angle at EI, a retrograde MCC burn was required. As the crew viewed the 
Earth through the COAS (along the LM +Z axis), the LM attitude would be changed so that the LM Y axis would 
be aligned with the Earth terminator and the horns formed by the terminator and the sunlit Earth surface were  
pointing in the LM –X axis direction (Figure 1, Figure 17). The Sun would be available in the AOT as an attitude 
check.  An AGS body axis alignment would then be performed.
A method for both a posigrade (to correct a steep flight path angle at EI) or a radial MCC burn (to control 
landing longitude for weather avoidance) was to body axis align the AGS after performing the above COAS/AOT 
retrograde attitude procedure.  An AGS maneuver to the burn attitude would then be performed.  
An alternate method for a posigrade maneuver was for the terminator to be aligned with the LM Y axis and the 
horns of the terminator were to be directed along the LM +X axis (Figure 1, Figure 18).   However, the Sun would 
not be visible in the AOT for an attitude check.24
However, use of only the Earth terminator for alignment (no Sun check in the AOT) could result in a yaw 
misalignment in burn attitude.  Analysis indicated that the post PC+2 burn trajectory was inclined 8 degrees to the 
ecliptic plane.  Since the most critical direction for the burn was along the local horizontal, the LM yaw attitude 
error was deemed acceptable.
A computer window view program was used by Houston personnel to provide LM window and AOT views for 
MCC burns (this had also been done in support of DPS-2). The program created views showing what stars and 
planets (including the Moon and Sun) would be visible in the windows and the AOT for a particular attitude.28
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D. MCC-5 Execution
LM power-up for MCC-5 was begun at 104:36 GET using an updated 30 minute contingency checklist.  The 
PTC rotation was stopped and the crew powered up the AGS and ASA.  The PGNS was not used for MCC-5 to 
save power. For MCC-5, the previously mentioned retrograde attitude procedure was used to achieve the burn 
attitude for AGS body axis alignment.  The cusps of the Earth terminator were placed on the Y axis of the COAS 
(Figure 17, Figure 19). The illuminated part of the Earth was placed at the top of the reticle. Pitch attitude was 
achieved by placing the Sun in the upper portion of the AOT (Figure 20). This procedure aimed the LM +Z axis at 
the Earth and aligned the LM +X axis retrograde along the local horizontal.  An AGS body axis alignment was 
performed, followed by transitioning the AGS to the automatic attitude hold mode.  A maneuver to burn attitude 
was performed, followed by another body axis alignment. 
MCC-5 was performed with the AGS and the DPS.  Execution of MCC-5 with the LM RCS was ruled out 
since the RCS burn duration would exceed the LM RCS deflector plume impingement constraint of 40 seconds.  
The DPS would perform the burn at 12.6% thrust.  While the AGS was used by the crew for burn monitoring data, 
attitude control and burn ignition and cut-off were controlled manually by the crew.  The DPS gimbals were 
disabled and the crew would control roll and pitch using the TTCA.  Analysis indicated low angular accelerations 
could be expected during the burn.  The crew was to shutdown the engine manually one second early to prevent an 
over-burn.  A –X LM RCS trim to correct an over-burn could exceed the 15 second CSM plume impingement 
constraint.  Although an External Delta-Velocity guidance mode was available in the AGS, there was concern about 
AGS accelerometer performance due to the long period of low temperatures, therefore a manual burn was 
performed.  In addition, Mission Control was confident that the burn duration predicted by ground analysis was 
accurate. 
AGS driven FDAI pitch and roll error needles were used for attitude control cues by the crew during the burn. 
The commander controlled roll with his TTCA and LM pilot controlled pitch with his TTCA. Yaw was controlled 
by the AGS in the automatic attitude hold mode. The CM pilot called out engine on and off events and tracked 
time-to-go to the end of the burn. The DPS was shut down by the crew based on the burn duration supplied by 
Mission Control.  MCC-5 was scheduled for 105:30 GET.  However, the crew was ahead of the timeline and the 
burn time of ignition was not critical, so the burn was executed early at 105:18 GET.  After the burn the crew 
nulled the LM +X delta-velocity residual to the desired value minus the uncompensated ASA accelerometer bias 
observed before the burn.  The burn was successful.
Figure 17. COAS view of Earth for a retrograde trajectory 
correction burn.15
Figure 18. COAS view of Earth for a posigrade trajectory 
correction burn.15
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Figure 20. MCC-5 burn AOT view.28
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Figure 19. MCC-5 burn LM commander’s window view.28
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E. Post MCC-5 Activities
After MCC-5, most LM systems were powered down.  The crew maneuvered to the PTC rotation attitude in 
pitch and roll using the TTCA.  The FDAI error needles, driven by the AGS, were used for piloting cues.  Once in 
attitude the PTC rotation was started manually in LM yaw.
The supercritical helium burst disk ruptured at 108:54 GET and vented 27.5 pounds of helium into space.  The 
vent stopped the 0.3 degree/second PTC rotation, started a reverse yaw rate, and imparted a small pitch rate.  The 
crew had been told that the vent would be non-propulsive since the helium vent was designed to nullify thrust and 
analysis predicted that the vent would impart no more than 0.003 feet/second to the spacecraft.  The rotational 
motion was allowed to continue since it did not negatively impact spacecraft thermal control. The roll rate 
increased from 18 minutes/revolution to 2 minutes/revolution.  This increased antenna switching.  The crew was 
given the option of not switching antennas and accepting data dropouts, but the crew elected to continue manual 
switching of antennas. The vent had little observable impact on tracking data.15, 29
Due to the large amount of small debris around the LM/CSM stack from the tank incident through SM 
separation, the crew was not able to reliably sight stars. After the first urine dump, Mission Control stated no more 
would be performed for a while as the dump degraded crew visibility of stars and could perturb the return to Earth 
trajectory.1,15 However, the crew misinterpreted this to mean for the duration of the mission.  The SM vented 
periodically during the mission and this also reduced star visibility. At one point after MCC-5, when there was no 
SM venting, the crew was able to identify some constellations while looking through the AOT. 
Mission Control briefed the crew on the plan for pre-entry CM power-up at 120:22 GET.  The crew chose not 
to wear their space suits during the entry, and Mission Control agreed with the decision.  Changes to the CM and 
LM stowage lists in preparation for LM jettison and CM entry were verbally communicated to the crew.  Later, at 
130 hours GET, stowage activities resulted in a CM re-entry lift to drag ratio (L/D) of 0.29.  The nominal value of 
L/D was 0.31.
F. MCC-6
The MCC-6 burn had been scheduled for 118 hours GET.  It was canceled since the predicted MCC-7 burn 
was only ~3 feet/second.
G. MCC-7 Planning
A ten hour meeting of Mission Control and other personnel was held on Wednesday, April 15, 1970, to 
develop an integrated crew checklist covering the eight hours before EI.  Activities to be conducted during this 
period were the MCC-7 burn, SM separation, CM power-up, CM computer initialization, PGNCS IMU alignment,  
.
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Figure 21. MCC-7 burn Alignment Optical Telescope 
(AOT) view.28
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and LM jettison.  MCC-7 was originally scheduled for EI-4 hours.  However, both MCC-7 and SM separation were 
moved one hour earlier, to EI-5 hours and EI-4.5 hours respectively, to provide more time for the crew to execute 
the pre-entry timeline.  This recommendation was based on input after evaluation of the checklist by astronauts.
By approximately 127 hours GET, MCC navigation solutions based on MSFN tracking indicated an EI flight 
path angle of -6.0 degrees.  An MCC-7 delta-velocity of 2.7 feet/second was computed.  It was desirable to not 
perform MCC-7 unless absolutely necessary to improve conditions at EI.  A study was performed that determined 
that the acceptable range of flight path angles at EI could be increased.24 The crew reported that the CM windows 
were covered with condensation, and that the crew would try to remove the water before the SM separation to 
facilitate photography.  
H. MCC-7 Attitude Alignment
At 133:19 GET the crew reported that the PTC rotation had degraded to the point that the Sun was illuminating 
the SPS engine bell rather than the entire spacecraft, and did not illuminate the LM cabin windows.  This lowered 
the temperature in the LM cabin and prevented the crew from resting.  Sufficient water and power margins 
permitted a 3 hour early LM power-up that began at 133:24 GET.  The PTC rates were nulled and the AGS and 
PGNS were activated. 
A decision was made to perform a PGNS alignment with the AOT, followed later by a reverse docked transfer 
alignment to the CSM PGNCS.  A transfer alignment was preferred over a PGNCS alignment using the sextant 
since that option required the LM to maneuver to the CSM sextant sighting attitudes. The AGS was body axis 
aligned using crew sightings on the Earth terminator using the COAS. The LM PGNS was powered up and a coarse 
alignment was performed to the AGS. 
A Sun/Moon sighting was then performed to refine the PGNS alignment. Acquisition of the Sun and Moon was 
accomplished by pitching in a plane roughly parallel to the ecliptic plane. Attitude was controlled by the LM pilot. 
The commander gave commands when the AOT reticle lines bisected the Sun and Moon. The crew had difficulty 
controlling the stack with the TTCA for alignment.  The MCC-7 alignment was maintained throughout the entry 
preparation period.
After the alignment was complete it was transferred by the crew to the CMC.  The crew maneuvered the 
spacecraft to the MCC-7 burn attitude so that the Sun and Earth were correctly positioned in the AOT (Figure 21) 
and the commander’s window (Figure 22). The crew positioned the “horns” of the Earth terminator in the COAS 
(Figure 17). FDAI error needles (Figure 9), driven by PGNS, were to be used to trim the burn attitude, but the error 
needles were fully deflected due to the procedures used to bring up the PGNS. However, the computer’s displayed 
digital attitude was in agreement with the out-the-window view and data supplied by Mission Control.
Figure 22. MCC-7 burn LM commander’s window view.28
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‡ For Apollo missions through 12 the SM +roll RCS jets were fired for 5.5 seconds and the –X jets were fired to propellant depletion or loss of 
SM power to maximize the separation distance between the CM and SM.  However, on Apollo 11 tip-off moments caused SM propellant slosh, 
changed the rotational dynamics, and introduced retrograde translational motion.  The Apollo 11 crew observed the SM tumbling as it passed 
them about 5 minutes after separation and the –X jets were still firing.  Photographic data of the SM and CM entry indicated that the SM did not 
skip out of the atmosphere into a high apogee orbit as expected but disintegrated near the CM.  In November of 1969, in preparation for Apollo 
13, the SM Jettison Controller was changed to fire the +roll jets for 2 seconds and the –X jets for 25 seconds.  However, due to the loss of SM 
power during Apollo 13 the new procedure was not executed until Apollo 14.30
I. MCC-7 Execution
The MCC-7 checklist was prepared to support either a DPS or RCS burn.  However, the predicted low delta-
velocity (2.8 feet/second) resulted in selection of RCS.  The original plan had been to use the PGNS for monitoring 
and backup attitude control.  Mission Control later decided to use the PGNS to execute the burn.  However, the on-
board crew procedures were for the burn to be performed with the AGS and the TTCA, with the PGNS providing 
data to the crew for burn monitoring.  A PGNS to AGS transfer alignment was performed to ensure the AGS had an 
accurate alignment.
The crew manually maneuvered the spacecraft in minimum impulse mode to roughly the MCC-7 attitude, and 
then a PGNS auto maneuver was performed to more precisely achieve the burn attitude.  The auto maneuver 
consumed more propellant than expected and the crew went back to the minimum impulse mode.  The PGNS 
driven FDAI error needles did not zero at the burn attitude leading to some concern about the validity of the PGNS.  
Due to the full deflection of the FDAI error needles and higher than expected RCS propellant consumption while 
under PGNS control, Mission Control changed the plan a second time and elected to use the AGS for MCC-7 
instead of the PGNS.  With AGS selected the crew maneuvered to the burn attitude in pulse mode using the TTCA.
MCC-7 was performed at EI-5 hours (137:39 GET). The same manual piloting technique used for MCC-5 was 
used for control during MCC-7.  This was manual crew pitch and roll control with the TTCA and automatic yaw 
control by the AGS.  MCC-7 was performed with LM RCS using the +X translation push button.  It steepened the 
flight path angle at EI to -6.49 degrees.  After MCC-7, the crew maneuvered the spacecraft to the SM separation 
attitude.  The CM re-entry RCS system was activated and a firing test of the thrusters was successful.
IX. SM and LM Separation
Before re-entry the SM and LM had to be separated from the CM.  A contingency procedure for LM separation 
at EI-1 hour had been developed earlier in the Apollo Program.  The procedure optimized separation distances and 
directions while maintaining nominal EI trajectory conditions for the CM.15 This procedure was modified for use 
during Apollo 13.24 The SM was jettisoned first as the SM systems were not required for crew survival or to 
prepare the CM for re-entry.  SM separation planning objectives included post separation photography that could be 
critical to the post-flight investigation.  Mitigation of re-contact risk during the remainder of the flight was a 
concern.  
After SM separation, the LM continued to provide life support, communications, power, and GNC 
functionality.  LM power was necessary to accomplish CM systems power-up for re-entry.  LM separation planning 
included re-contact risk mitigation during dual vehicle entry and use of a non-RCS method to achieve separation.  
The crew timeline during the separations was critical as many activities had to be completed prior to EI (Figure 23). 
A. SM Separation
Studies were conducted to create post SM separation attitude timelines that permitted photography of the 
damaged SM from the LM/CM.  Photographs of the SM would aid the post-flight investigation of the incident.  The 
objective was to minimize required attitude maneuvers while providing the lighting conditions appropriate for 
photography.  Studies included examining gimbal angles to ensure gimbal lock could be avoided during separation 
and SM photography.
Separation of the CM and SM was normally performed approximately 15 minutes before EI (400,000 feet).  In 
a nominal mission the SM separation was performed posigrade (19 degrees above the local horizontal) and out-of-
plane (45 degrees) and the SM RCS thrusters were fired after separation to maximize the separation distance during 
re-entry.‡ However, the loss of SM power prevented the use of the SM RCS system for separation.  Apollo 13 
separation procedures were also designed so the LM power and RCS propellant would be used and the CM battery 
power and RCS propellant would be conserved for re-entry. 
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For Apollo 13, SM separation was changed to an in-plane radial separation at EI-4.5 hours that placed the SM 
well behind the CM when the CM reached EI.  The in-plane separation at EI-4.5 hours reduced the risk of 
undesirable re-contact before and during re-entry, and provided more time for CM/LM separation and CM re-entry 
preparation (Figure 24).  Re-contact risk for the EI-15 minute out-of-plane separation on nominal missions was low 
under nominal separation conditions.
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Figure 24.  Mission planning plot of Service Module (SM) relative motion 
after separation from the Lunar Module/Command Module (LM/CM) stack 
for separation times of EI-3.5 and EI-4.5 hours.24
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Figure 25.  Service Module photographed after separation 
from the Lunar Module and Command Module.
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The crew maneuvered to the SM jettison attitude immediately following MCC-7 using the AGS pulse mode 
and the TTCA.  After the jettison attitude was achieved attitude control was maintained using the PGNS in 
minimum impulse.  SM separation occurred at EI-4.75 hours with the crew using the LM RCS to perform a push-
pull separation maneuver.  The intent was to impart a zero net delta-velocity to the LM/CM.  The initial SM jettison 
delta-velocity of 0.5 feet/second along the LM +X body axis was commanded using the +X translation push button 
in the LM, after which the CM pilot in the CM jettisoned the SM. The subsequent 0.5 feet/second along the LM –X 
body axis was commanded with the TTCA in the LM.  The separation was successful, but it was later estimated 
that ~1 foot/second was imparted to the LM/CM.15
LM active attitude control after SM jettison was performed with the Attitude Controller Assembly (ACA) 
rather than the Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly (TTCA).  SM jettison changed the spacecraft mass 
properties such that the ACA commanded LM RCS jet firings could provide sufficient attitude control authority in 
roll and pitch.  The ACA was normally used for manual attitude control during LM only flight.
The crew had been told that CM window #5 would provide the best view for SM photography after separation.  
The LM pitched down during separation, and as a result, the SM was not visible through CM window #5.  The crew 
pitched the vehicle up to see the SM through LM commander’s overhead docking window.  Manual attitude control 
of a LM/CM stack without a SM had not been practiced by the crew during training, nor had this spacecraft 
configuration ever been flown.
Since no photographs could be taken through CM window #5, the CM pilot transferred to the LM to help with 
SM photography through the LM windows.  The spacecraft was maneuvered so the SM was visible through the 
right hand LM pilot front window (Figure 25). 
B. CM IMU Alignment
After the SM photo session was complete the spacecraft was maneuvered back to the SM jettison attitude.  LM 
umbilical power was removed from the CM at 140:10 GET (EI-2.5 hours) and the CM power-up was begun.  On a 
normal mission the CM batteries were brought on-line 30 minutes before EI.  
The SM separation attitude was used during the alignment instead of a Moon sighting attitude as it was 
anticipated that stars might be visible to the crew after SM separation.  The crew attempted to perform a CM IMU 
alignment with the sextant. Light reflecting from the LM sublimator and a LM RCS quad prevented star 
identification using the CM scanning telescope.  Maneuvering the stack by 20 degrees in an attempt to reduce the 
reflections did not improve star visibility.  Particles originating from the CM/SM umbilical area also made star 
identification difficult. 
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A reverse docked coarse alignment of the CM platform to the LM platform was to be performed with the LM 
holding the spacecraft at the SM separation attitude.  Mission Control was to compute and verbally communicate to 
the crew corresponding CM IMU gimbal angles so that the CM IMU coarse alignment could be performed.  While 
the reversed docked coarse alignment would have been sufficient for re-entry, a star alignment was desired to 
ensure platform alignment accuracy.  This coarse alignment was intended to permit the crew to acquire the stars 
Vega and Altair so that sextant marks could be taken.15, 23, 29
If the command module pilot could not identify stars after the coarse align, Mission Control would have 
provided FDAI angles to the commander so that the LM could be maneuvered to Moon and Sun sighting attitudes.  
The command module pilot would then have performed a Sun-Moon alignment using the CM optics.  
Mission Control verbally communicated CM gimbal angles to the command module pilot.  Both the CM IMU 
coarse alignment and the sextant alignment were successfully completed by 140:55 GET and a Sun-Moon 
alignment was not required.
Poor communications, caused by spacecraft attitude, complicated execution of the pre-entry timeline and 
reception of data needed by the crew.  The quality of voice and high-bit-rate telemetry communications was poor at 
times.  High-bit-rate communications could not be maintained and the upload from Mission Control of CMC 
parameters for re-entry was performed at the low bit rate.  This activity took longer than normal.  Required uplinks 
were delayed until 140:40 GET due to difficulty maintaining lock on the spacecraft.  The impact of spacecraft 
attitude on communications quality had not been foreseen by the crew or Mission Control.25
C. LM Separation 
After CM IMU alignment was complete (140:55 GET) the spacecraft was maneuvered to the LM jettison 
attitude using the LM RCS.  Once the maneuver was complete at 141:02 GET the spacecraft was placed in an AGS 
attitude hold with wide attitude error dead bands.  The LM was maneuvered to an incorrect roll (LM body frame) 
attitude that placed the CM IMU platform near gimbal lock.  The desired LM roll was 135 degrees but the 
spacecraft was maneuvered to 235 degrees LM roll.  While the LM –X axis had been correctly aligned along the 
positive radius vector during the maneuver, the vehicle was yawed (CM body frame) 45 degrees on the north side of 
the CM entry ground track rather than 45 degrees on the south side (Figures 26, 27, and 28). 
By the time Mission Control had recognized the attitude error the CM and LM hatches were being installed by 
the crew.  The minimum LM/CM separation was predicted to be 4,000 feet at EI.  The initial CM roll angle after EI 
would steer the CM to the north, but subsequent modulation of the lift vector would move it away from the LM 
orbital plane.  The in-plane separation of the vehicles was judged to be adequate for a nominal entry.  The 
separation was not optimum if the crew flew a roll right (CM body frame) constant 4g entry due to PGNCS and 
EMS failures, but the separation was judged to be adequate.  Due to these factors and the time-critical nature of the 
pre-entry timeline, Mission Control chose not to correct the spacecraft attitude before LM separation.15
The maneuver to the LM separation attitude was complicated by efforts to avoid CM platform gimbal lock.  
This required close coordination between the commander in the LM and the CM pilot in the CSM.  The maneuver 
consumed a considerable amount of propellant.  Had a gimbal lock occurred, a recovery procedure would have been 
executed to re-establish platform alignment before entry.  Recovering from gimbal lock would have complicated the 
remaining part of the pre-EI timeline.25
The docking probe and drogue hardware, along with many other items, were left in the LM as a part of the 
stowage plan to achieve the desired CM L/D for re-entry.  Before leaving the LM the crew placed the spacecraft in 
an AGS controlled attitude hold with wide attitude error deadbands.29 After the hatches were in place Mission 
Control closely monitored the CM IMU gimbal angles.  If maintenance of the attitude hold by the LM AGS drove 
the CM IMU close to gimbal lock the crew would have performed the separation early.  LM attitude control 
between hatch closure and separation was nominal and the CM IMU gimbal lock did not occur. 
The separation used delta-velocity, imparted from air venting, from the docking tunnel at separation.  The CM 
RCS could not be used since CM RCS propellant was required for re-entry.  Before undocking, the tunnel pressure 
was reduced to 2.2 psi to achieve the desired delta-velocity of ~2 feet/second.  Apollo 10 (May 1969) LM jettison 
data was used to determine the appropriate docking tunnel pressure differential to achieve the desired delta-
velocity.§
§ During Apollo 10 the crew could not vent the docking tunnel as required before both undockings.  Post flight investigation revealed that the 
vent line was terminated with a plug rather than the required fitting with holes in it.  The pre-flight end-to-end docking tunnel vent test had been 
waived for Apollo 10.  For Apollo 11 and subsequent flights the pre-flight vent test was performed.
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Figure 26. Mission planning plot of Lunar Module (LM) altitude versus 
down-range relative motion after separation from the Command 
Module (CM).24
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versus down-range relative motion after separation from the Command 
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The LM was jettisoned 70 minutes before EI, 10 minutes earlier than planned, at 141:30 GET (Figure 29). 
Sensed velocity at LM jettison was -0.65 feet/second along the LM X and -0.02 feet/second along the LM Y axis.  
The separation was stable and the LM continued to be stable within the AGS 5 degree attitude error deadband until 
LM loss-of-signal at 142:38 GET.
X. Ground Preparations for Entry and Landing
In addition to the development of CM power-up procedures a significant amount of analysis was performed to 
ensure that the crew could perform a safe entry and landing.24 The use of four Mission Control teams allowed the 
entry and landing team (the White Team) to withdraw from the shift rotation and spend two days developing a new 
entry timeline and procedures in conjunction with MPAD, and other NASA and contractor personnel. The White 
Team later supported the pre-entry and entry phase of the mission in Mission Control.15
A. IMU Alignment and Performance
Normally a pre-EI check of IMU alignment was performed by observing the Earth horizon through the center 
hatch window.  A scale along the edge of the window enabled the crew to check attitude of the CM with respect to 
the horizon.  However, analysis indicated that the Earth horizon was dark until just before EI.  The Apollo 10 and 
12 crews had observed the Moon above the Earth horizon before EI.21,31 Apollo 13 analysis also indicated that the 
Moon would be visible just above the horizon before EI.  As a result the pre-EI horizon check was replaced with a 
moonset check. The crew was provided with an inertial attitude that placed the almost full moon in the CM left 
front window at the 36 degree mark (Figure 30).  This attitude was to be maintained until the Moon set at EI-2.5 
minutes. It also minimized CM RCS propellant needed to maneuver to the entry attitude.  
B. Entry Guidance 
In the event of both PGNCS and EMS failures, a constant 4g entry could be flown using the secondary g-meter 
and the roll attitude indicator display.  A new landing point for the constant 4g entry procedure was determined.
The mission abort resulted in an L/D ratio that was slightly lower than nominal.  The actual L/D value was 
outside the update limits for several entry guidance parameters that were determined pre-mission.  Due to the 
complex crew timeline before EI, it was desirable to avoid having the crew update the entry guidance parameters in 
the CMC.  A study determined that for an entry range of approximately 1250 nm the pre-mission parameter values 
were acceptable.   Therefore, an update of the entry guidance parameters was not required.
Figure 30. Pre-Entry Interface (EI) Command Module left 
front window view of Moon.28
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Once the horizon became visible the IMU 
alignment check was performed.  If the IMU passed 
the check, the crew would change the CM pitch 
attitude to achieve the re-entry trim attitude.  If the 
horizon check indicated an IMU misalignment the 
crew would track the horizon through the window 
until the 0.05g deceleration point was reached and 
closed loop entry guidance was initiated.  
Analysis was performed to determine if the cold 
environment of the CM could negatively impact 
PGNCS performance during entry.  A crack in an 
IMU accelerometer bellows caused by the low 
temperatures could cause an accelerometer bias.  
This bias could in turn result in an entry target miss 
distance of approximately 30 nm.  However, pre-
mission simulations indicated that an accelerometer 
bias and target miss at this level would not 
complicate crew monitoring of the trajectory during 
re-entry.  In spite of the extended period of low 
temperature in the CM, Mission Control judged the 
PGNCS “go” for entry.
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The mission abort also changed the orbital inclination of the entry trajectory from the nominal 40 degrees to 30 
degrees.  This trajectory difference changed pre-entry parameters that were displayed to the crew.  Analysis was 
performed to determine changes in displayed parameters resulting from the inclination difference.  The analysis 
was later used to verify numbers seen by the crew before entry.
C. Debris Impact Analysis
Orbital debris and re-entry footprint analysis was performed for nominal entry for each Apollo mission for the 
SM and the S-IVB Saturn Launch Adapter panels.  This data was used to compute land impact and casualty 
probabilities.   It was also supplied to the Federal Aviation Administration to request air corridor reservations.  
However, entry dispersion analysis had not been performed for a re-entering LM.  Computation of LM entry 
dispersion ellipses required considerable effort.  
The capability existed to compute the impact point of the ALSEP Graphite LM Fuel Cask (GLFC).  The GLFC 
contained radioactive fuel for the SNAP-27 radioisotope thermal generator.  However, impact dispersion ellipses 
had never been calculated for a re-entering GLFC.  This was done as part of the entry preparation.
Dispersion analysis was performed to ensure that the CM and debris from the SM and LM avoided land and 
populated areas. One aspect of the dispersion studies included variations in SM and LM separation delta-velocity.  
Due to the potential safety hazard, these issues received attention from NASA Headquarters.  Analysis indicated 
that the re-entering vehicles posed no hazard to land or populated areas.  Furthermore, dispersion studies indicated 
that the GLFC would impact in deep water. 
The 10 minute early LM jettison, the ~90 degree LM jettison yaw error (CM body frame), and trajectory 
changes moved the impact predictions approximately 60 nm.  However, the original dispersion analysis was judged 
to still be valid.24
XI. Entry and Landing
After separation, the crew maneuvered away from the near-gimbal lock attitude to the entry attitude.  Entry 
attitude accuracy and IMU platform alignment were confirmed by a sextant star check.  Tracking data showed a 
slight change in the EI flight path angle to -6.2 degrees.  However, this was within expectations and did not require 
a change to the normal heads to Earth orientation of the CM at the start of re-entry to re-orient the lift vector.
The pre-entry check and initialization of the EMS were normal. The Moon set at the predicted time (EI-2.5 
minutes) and the location of the Moon in the left front window (Figure 30) indicated a good IMU alignment.21 The 
CM was then maneuvered to the EI attitude.
Although tropical storm Helen in the mid-Pacific caused some concern early in the mission it had dissipated by 
the landing day.  The USS Iwo Jima covered the PGNCS and EMS landing points.  The naval research ship USS 
Granville S. Hall covered the constant 4g entry target point.
The crew entered the nominal entry checklist 20 minutes before EI.  GNC procedures for entry were the same 
as for a nominal lunar mission.  However, the EMS was initiated manually when the 0.05g light remained off three 
seconds after the actual 0.05g deceleration time.  In addition, the EMS trace of load factor versus velocity was 
unexpectedly narrow and required concentration to read. Entry guidance and flight control performance was 
normal. The first deceleration peak reached approximately 5g.  
The spacecraft splashed down into the Pacific Ocean on Friday, April 17, 1970 at 12:07:41 p.m. Central 
Standard Time (CST) after a mission duration of 142 hrs, 54 minutes, and 41 seconds. The splashdown point was 
21º 38’ south latitude, 165º 22’ west longitude, and southeast of American Samoa.  Splashdown was about 1 nm 
from the targeted point and 3.5 nm from the recovery ship USS Iwo Jima.  The commander later reported that the 
landing decelerations were mild in comparison to his previous flight on Apollo 8.21 The CM remained in the stable 
upright attitude after parachute release.  Crew egress from the CM occurred at 12:35 pm CST and the crew was on-
board the USS Iwo Jima by 12:53 pm CST (Figure 31).15
Due to the limited power available, the data storage equipment recorder was not run during entry.  No entry 
data were available for post-flight analysis.  The CM IMU was not heated for approximately 80 hours during the 
mission.  The accurate landing indicated that IMU alignment and performance was nominal in spite of the extended 
power-down.23
Parts of the LM that survived atmospheric entry, including the SNAP-27 radioisotope electric power generator, 
that had been planned to power the ALSEP apparatus on the lunar surface and contained 8.6 lb of plutonium, fell 
into the Pacific Ocean northeast of New Zealand. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Figure 31. Haise, Swigert, and Lovell aboard the USS Iwo Jima.
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¶ The level of spacecraft autonomy is an important consideration to meet mission requirements for some spacecraft.  Reference 
36, “Challenges of Orion Rendezvous Development,” contains a detailed discussion of the appropriate balance between 
autonomy, automation, and crew or ground authority over the spacecraft.
XII. Observations on Apollo 13 GNC Challenges
Personnel who participate in spacecraft development today may never have performed flight operations to 
recover from a spacecraft emergency.  Simulations can provide flight control teams with some experience after a 
vehicle has been designed and built.  Studying past spacecraft emergencies may be of benefit to development and 
flight operations personnel when defining and designing vehicle systems and operating procedures.32, 33 Flexibility 
in both on-board systems and the ground support organizations is required. Previous spacecraft emergencies can 
provide lessons and observations that could be useful for other flight programs.
Responses to failures that occur during time critical powered ascent or entry (phases also known as “high 
speed flight”) do not permit real-time development of contingency procedures.  Responses during high speed flight 
must be scripted.  The Challenger and Columbia accidents occurred during high speed flight.  There was little or no 
action that could have been taken to save the Challenger crew if the Solid Rocket Booster O-ring burn-through had 
been recognized after lift-off, or the compromised Columbia thermal protection system had been recognized after 
the de-orbit burn.  However, had the compromised thermal protection system been recognized while Columbia was 
on-orbit, it is possible that action could have been taken to conserve Columbia consumables long enough for a 
rescue orbiter to be launched.34, 35
A. Ground Support is Essential
Recovery of the Apollo 13 crew required a considerable amount of systems insight and analysis not directly 
available to the crew on-board the spacecraft.¶ A wide variety of ground personnel and supporting organizations 
throughout the United States played a critical role in the safe return of the crew.  Considerable effort by ground 
personnel was required to resolve the S-IVB/LM S-Band frequency conflict, compute LM impact dispersion 
ellipses, develop new burn procedures, develop SM separation procedures to facilitate crew photography, ensure 
the safety of dual vehicle (LM and CM) entry, develop CM power-up procedures, devise a method for scrubbing 
CO2 from the LM using CM LiOH canisters, develop alignment and attitude control procedures, and develop and 
verify new procedures for other systems.
Some teams may only support specific phases of a nominal mission, but may be required to provide round-the-
clock support during a spacecraft emergency.  Personnel that conducted pre-mission planning provided key re-
planning and analysis support to the flight control teams.
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B. Spacecraft Recovery with Limited Systems Functionality May be Required
Options available for spacecraft recovery may be limited due to physical damage, malfunctions, or systems 
limitations not directly related to the system in question.  For example, Apollo 13 did not involve physical damage 
or malfunction of CSM or LM GNC hardware and software.  However, the functionality of the SM SPS and RCS 
propellant and propulsion system was questionable, as was the ability of the SM structure to support a SPS burn.  
LM and CSM GNC functionality was limited, due to power and thermal control limits.  In addition, the debris 
environment around the CSM/LM limited the usefulness of the CSM sextant and LM AOT to perform IMU 
alignments based on star sightings.
An incident might prevent the use of some backup equipment and procedures.  The CSM power-down made 
the cis-lunar navigation and return to Earth targeting programs unavailable to the crew.  These would have been 
needed in the event of an extended communications outage with Mission Control.  These backup capabilities were 
not available in the LM GNC system.
C. Create New or Modified Plans and Procedures 
Like ascent and entry, some on-orbit failures can be of a time critical nature.  Once vehicle systems have been 
stabilized and vehicle systems status is known, additional time may be available to develop contingency procedures 
and alternative mission plans.  Checklists and procedures (both ground and on-board) may require considerable 
modification during a spacecraft emergency.  Many procedures used in the recovery of Apollo 13 had been 
previously developed and some new procedures were developed as well.  Contingency procedures will evolve as a 
flight progresses.15
Contingency procedure development during a spacecraft emergency is a rapid process and entails some risk.  It 
does not have the luxury of a long pre-mission development and verification period.  Pre-mission procedure 
development is lower risk due to careful attention to detail by multiple organizations, extensive testing and 
simulation, and training of crew and ground personnel.  However, it is not possible to anticipate, develop, and 
certify contingency procedures to counter every systems anomaly that might arise.
Quick and simple procedures for power-up, power-down, and other activities are needed that can be performed 
with minimal oversight from ground personnel.  It is important to focus on essential tasks and keep the procedures 
simple.  These procedures should be defined and verified before flights begin.  Flight experience and evolving 
knowledge of vehicle systems performance can be used to improve contingency procedures over the life of a flight 
program.
During the recovery of Apollo 13, ground personnel discovered they could do procedures with fewer systems 
powered up than originally anticipated.  Low power modes of operation should be identified and appropriate 
procedures and crew training developed to facilitate their use.
Limited electrical power and LM GNC system software functionality designed to support the low lunar orbit 
phase and lunar landings necessitated the modification of previously developed or new contingency procedures.   In 
some cases these procedures were labor intensive.  For example, the manual burn procedure used for MCC-5 and 
MCC-7 required the efforts of all three crew members.  
Some procedures required for spacecraft recovery may never have been executed during a mission.  For 
example, the CM had never been powered down and powered up in space.  The Apollo 13 crew did not have a 
CSM activation checklist.21 The crew had to perform manual attitude control of the CM/LM stack after SM 
separation.  This was not a normal spacecraft configuration, and crew members had never been trained to perform 
this piloting task.  Limited power required the power-down of the LM FDAIs and the use of digital gimbal angles to 
avoid gimbal lock.  Use of computer displayed digital angles during piloting was challenging and had not been 
practiced during training.
D. Clearly Define the Problems to be Solved
During a spacecraft emergency, confusion may exist among ground support personnel concerning vehicle 
status and what tasks must be worked to recover the vehicle and crew.  During the first hours after the oxygen tank 
incident, confusion about vehicle systems status and current mission plan led personnel to work false problems or 
ones that were not clearly defined.24
Effective leadership and communication is required so that vehicle status, tasks to be worked, personnel 
required, and resources needed (simulators, software tools, labs, etc.) is understood by all organizations.  A 
significant amount of effort may be required to define which ground support tasks must be worked to recover from 
a spacecraft emergency and to develop a coordinated mission recovery plan.  If tasks and objectives are not clearly 
.
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defined, ground support personnel may waste time and resources attempting to solve ill-defined problems.  This in 
turn adds risk to recovering from the spacecraft emergency.
Additional personnel may be called in during spacecraft emergencies that do not normally provide real-time 
support.  These personnel must be integrated with the rest of the flight control team so that they are kept up-to-date 
on vehicle status and evolving mission event requirements.  This integration and continuous, clear communication 
can avoid confusion and wasted effort.  A need for new tools or the identification of new trajectory techniques may 
occur during a spacecraft emergency.  Roles and responsibilities of flight control team members and additional 
personnel brought in to provide support must be clearly defined.
E. Avoid Procedural Errors and Associated Risk
During a time-critical spacecraft emergency crew and ground support personnel may be acting on incorrect or 
incomplete information.  Personnel may also be working long hours with little opportunity for rest, exercise, and 
proper eating.  Under these conditions it is easy for personnel to make mistakes when using analysis tools, 
developing procedures, performing tasks, and communicating important information.  Attempts to perform rapid 
analysis in a high pressure, time critical spacecraft emergency can lead to errors in analysis and faulty conclusions.  
For example, the spacecraft was maneuvered to the wrong LM/CM separation attitude, ~45 degrees on the 
north side of the CM ground track rather than the desired 45 degrees on the south side of the CM ground track 
(Figure 28).  This attitude was close to CM IMU gimbal lock and complicated manual piloting.  
Capability limitations and mission-to-mission reconfiguration requirements of software tools should be well 
understood before a spacecraft emergency to reduce the possibility of errors.  These errors can result in time 
consuming attempts to understand questionable or incorrect data. Ground personnel must be thoroughly familiar 
with software tool operation and configuration to avoid incorrect initialization and procedural errors.  Additional 
knowledgeable personnel can perform quality assurance checks of initialization data, output data, procedures, and 
analysis to ensure accuracy and adherence to best practices and appropriate processes. 
F. Ensure Good Air-To-Ground Communication and Manage the Crew Work Load
Good communications were essential to the successful return of the crew to Earth.  The crew of Apollo 13 
could not have autonomously returned to Earth.  Although many previously existing contingency procedures were 
used by the crew, many of these procedures required modification by Mission Control.  These modified procedures 
had to be accurately communicated to the crew.  However, in the final hours before entry the vehicle attitude 
resulted in degraded communications.  This complicated information transfer required to properly configure the 
CM for entry.
The ability of Mission Control to look over the shoulder of the crew and assist them, greatly speeded-up time 
critical procedure execution such as LM systems activation.  During time critical periods when there is uncertainty 
about vehicle systems status, ground and crew actions can be difficult to coordinate.
Although there was near continuous communications with the spacecraft, Mission Control permitted the crew 
to set the work and rest periods.  Non-critical procedures and requests were passed to the crew only when a crew 
member was available.15
G. Mitigating Risk of Development Does Not Always Mitigate Operational Risk
Careful selection of technology, at an appropriate maturity level,  may reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk 
during vehicle development.  However, reduction of development risk does not necessarily result in reduced risk 
during the flight phase of the program.  For example, a three gimbal IMU was chosen for Apollo as it was believed 
to represent a lower cost, schedule, development, and technical risk than a four gimbal IMU.  It also weighed less 
than a four gimbal IMU.  However, the need to avoid loss of IMU platform alignment due to gimbal lock 
complicated piloting procedures and mission planning.  This led to greater overall operational complexity and cost.  
However, the Gemini spacecraft successfully flew human missions in 1965 and 1966 with a four gimbal IMU that 
did not require special piloting and mission planning procedures to avoid a gimbal lock condition. 
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H. Orbital Lighting Conditions Challenge Humans and Electro-Optical Sensors
The Apollo spacecraft relied on crew sightings of stars or planets for IMU alignment.  An orbital debris cloud, 
venting from the SM, and reflections from LM structure, complicated or prevented crew identification of stars for 
IMU alignments.  Window visibility was also periodically limited by condensation.  In spite of these challenges the 
Earth, Moon, and Sun were easily discernable, as was the terminator on the Earth.  Sightings on the Sun, Moon, and 
Earth were used instead of star sightings for LM IMU alignment. However, alignments using the Earth, Moon, and 
Sun could not be practiced in the Apollo simulators.  The crew later reported that manual control of spacecraft 
attitude is easier if one has an easily discernable celestial body to use as a reference, such as the Earth or Moon.21
Apollo 13 GNC systems were not equipped with cameras or star trackers.  Space Shuttle experience has shown 
that the human eye is more adaptable to orbital lighting conditions than electro-optical devices.  Furthermore, 
orbital debris and reflections can complicate or prevent attitude determination by electro-optical devices such as 
star trackers and cameras.  The value of human eye or electro-optical sightings of easily discernable celestial bodies 
(Earth, Sun, Moon, planets, etc.) during extreme orbital lighting conditions should not be overlooked.
XIII. Conclusion
Successful recovery of the Apollo 13 crew was facilitated by pre-mission development of contingency 
procedures.  However, many of these procedures required extensive modification during the mission.  Pre-mission 
development of simple contingency procedures can posture a flight program to more effectively handle spacecraft 
emergencies.  Contingency procedures such as systems power-up should be quick and executable with a minimum 
of support required from ground personnel.  Contingency procedures and crew interfaces should be designed so 
only one crew member is required for execution.  Rapid execution of existing contingency procedures may be 
required to respond to unforeseen performance anomalies and systems limitations.  A spacecraft system may be 
fully functional, but performance issues in other systems (such as thermal control and power generation) may limit 
the use of a healthy system.  Furthermore, crew execution of new or modified procedures may be complicated due 
to a lack of training.
The Apollo 13 mission underlined the difficulty presented by orbital lighting conditions, an experience that has 
been encountered in other flight programs.  Use of advanced electro-optical sensors may be limited due to orbital 
lighting and debris conditions.  The human eye is more adaptable than electro-optical sensors under a wide variety 
of extreme lighting conditions.  Simple methods of attitude determination using the Sun, Moon, and Earth can 
overcome poor visibility conditions caused by debris that prevent star sightings.  
Unforeseen conflicts between spacecraft may arise, such as the frequency conflict between the LM and S-IVB 
S-Band transponders.  Simple tools, such as the COAS, AOT, and window scribe marks, were used to accomplish 
GNC tasks while consuming minimal spacecraft power and thermal control resources.  A particular technology may 
be chosen during spacecraft development to mitigate cost and schedule risk, but it could complicate ground and 
crew tasks during the flight phase of a program.  Input from an operations perspective must be sought and 
considered during selection of systems and technology for a vehicle.  Multiple spacecraft that participate in the 
same mission must be considered in an integrated fashion from the beginning of the vehicle design phase.  
The flexibility of the crew, ground support personnel, and the Apollo spacecraft systems was a key to the 
successful recovery of the crew.  Systems flexibility across the vehicles is needed to facilitate unforeseen use of 
systems in an effective manner in the event of a spacecraft emergency while conserving power and thermal control 
resources.  Continuous communication between the crew and Mission Control, and between various ground support 
organizations, facilitated timely development of new procedures and resolution of technical issues.
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Appendix A – LM GNC Architecture
The LM Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem (GN&CS) has two sections, the Primary Guidance and 
Navigation Section (PGNS) and the Abort Guidance Section (AGS) (Figure 32).  The PGNS provided GNC 
functionality during all LM mission phases.  The AGS provided minimal GNC functionality to enable the LM to 
return to the CSM in the event of a PGNS failure.  Both the PGNS and AGS relied on common hardware in the 
Control Electronics Section (CES).  
This appendix provides a basic overview of the PGNS, AGS, LM GN&CS Architecture Components, and LM 
propulsion.  Not all details of LM GN&CS design, operation, and functionality are addressed.11, 37, 38
A. Primary Guidance and Navigation Section (PGNS)
The PGNS provided primary GNC during all phases of LM flight and could support all LM mission phases.  
These phases included post undocking, descent orbit insertion, powered descent and landing, lunar surface 
operations, powered ascent, rendezvous, docking, and backup flight control while the LM is mated to the CSM.    
Unlike the Command Module Computer (CMC), the LM PGNS could not compute return to Earth and trajectory 
mid-course correction maneuvers, nor could it support optical cis-lunar navigation.
PGNS provided automatic flight control using a digital autopilot.  Manual or computer assisted manual flight 
control by the crew was also provided.  PGNS digital autopilot was designed to control three spacecraft 
configurations: 1) LM ascent and descent stages, 2) LM ascent stage, and 3) LM docked to the CSM (backup to the 
CMC flight control that is normally primary).  It was not originally intended to control a CSM/LM ascent stage 
stack.  The CSM Primary Guidance Navigation, and Control System (PGNCS) performed that function.
B. Abort Guidance Section (AGS) 
The AGS was the backup LM GNC section with a dedicated strapdown inertial sensor unit. In the event of a 
PGNS failure, the AGS provided basic functionality to permit the crew to achieve insertion into a safe orbit.  
Furthermore, the AGS supported LM active rendezvous with the CSM.  The AGS was available during all LM 
flight phases (pre-descent orbit coast, powered descent, lunar surface, powered ascent, rendezvous and docking).     
.
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Figure 32. Simplified Lunar Module (LM) Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) architecture.
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However, the AGS could not support a lunar landing, as a functioning PGNS was required for landing.  The CES 
provided flight control functionality for the AGS.
The LM PGNS was normally used for GNC during all phases of LM flight, with the AGS running in parallel in 
the event of a PGNS failure.  During nominal lunar flight phases (PGNS operational), the LM pilot performed AGS 
procedures so that the AGS could assume control of the vehicle at any time.  
AGS hardware and software were developed by different contractors than the PGNS hardware and software. 
This development and verification philosophy was similar to the later Space Shuttle Backup Flight System. 
C. LM GN&CS Architecture Components
This section details components of the LM GNC architecture.  Some of these components were used by both 
the PGNS and AGS, while others were exclusive to one section.  Many, but not all, components of the LM GNC 
architecture were used by the Apollo 13 crew, while performing attitude and burn procedures.  Components not 
used during the flight of Apollo 13 are identified.
1. PGNS Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
The PGNS IMU was a three gimbal stable member unit that provided measurements of integrated acceleration 
and integrated rate with respect to an inertial frame to the LM Guidance Computer.  The PGNS was aligned using 
angular measurements obtained by the Alignment Optical Telescope.  The same type of IMU was used in the CM.
2. Abort Sensor Assembly (ASA)
The ASA was a strapdown inertial sensor unit that provided measurements of integrated acceleration and 
integrated rate with respect to the LM body axis frame to the AGS Abort Electronics Assembly.  The ASA 
provided sufficient accuracy to recover from mission aborts while also providing a size and weight savings over the 
PGNS stable member IMU.  However, the ASA required periodic transfer alignments from the PGNS to maintain 
accuracy.  The ASA could also be aligned on the lunar surface using the ASA accelerometers to sense the local 
vertical.  A body axis align could be performed on the lunar surface or in orbit.  This alignment, used during the 
Apollo 13 mission, set the AGS inertial reference frame equal to the LM body axes.
3. Alignment Optical Telescope (AOT) 
The LM crew performed PGNS IMU alignments using the AOT (Figures 13 and 14) while in lunar orbit or on 
the lunar surface.  These alignments were accomplished by AOT angular measurements of two celestial objects, 
usually stars.  Once the PGNS IMU was aligned the alignment could be transferred to the AGS.
The AOT was a 1x power manual periscope with 6 viewing positions providing 360 degrees of coverage in 60 
degree increments. The center of the field of view in each position was 45 degrees above the LM Z/Y body axis 
plane (a plane parallel to the floor of the crew compartment). The crew rotated the AOT to the appropriate viewing 
position of the 6 available. However, the available AOT positions were limited while the LM was docked to the 
CSM due to blockage of the field of view. 
Only the forward looking position with a field of view above and forward of the LM crew windows and lunar 
surface hatch was used during Apollo 13 as the other AOT positions were blocked by the CM. Use of the AOT 
during Apollo 13 expanded the field of view of the crew beyond that provided by the commander and pilot landing 
windows.
4. LM Navigation Base 
The PGNS IMU, AGS ASA, and AOT were mounted on a light-weight navigation base designed to minimize 
relative misalignment. 
5. LM Guidance Computer (LGC)
The LGC used the same model of high speed general purpose computer as the CM primary GNC system.  
However, it contained software specific to the lunar module flight phases.  The LGC received input data from the 
PGNS IMU, the landing radar, rendezvous radar, the AOT, the Attitude Controller Assembly, and the 
Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly.  The crew could command the LGC and view LGC data through the 
Display and Keyboard (DSKY, Figure 12). 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
36
6. Display and Keyboard Panels (DSKY)
The DSKY (Figure 12) permitted the crew to issue commands to the LGC and view LGC data.  One DSKY 
was located on the main control panel between the commander and LM pilot. The LM DSKY differed from the 
CSM PGNCS DSKY only in caution and status indicators. 
7. Abort Electronics Assembly (AEA)  
The AEA was the AGS high speed digital flight computer that performed backup GNC functions including 
ASA alignment, strapdown navigation, guidance, and targeting.  Guidance included powered flight to achieve orbit 
insertion and execution of on-orbit maneuvers.  Targeting included rendezvous maneuver computation.  The AEA 
processed data from the ASA, PGNS LGC, and crew inputs from the DEDA.  It also provided data to crew 
displays.  As long as the PGNS was operating, the AEA could accept radar data automatically from the LGC.  If the 
AGS was in control (PGNS failure) rendezvous radar data was manually input into the AEA by the LM pilot.
8. Data Entry and Display Assembly (DEDA)
The DEDA permitted the LM pilot to issue commands to the AEA and view AEA data.  
9. Control Electronics Section (CES)
The CES processed both PGNS and AGS translation and attitude signals, as well as manual crew inputs.  These 
signals were routed by the CES to the appropriate propulsion system (RCS, ascent engine, descent engine).  
Components of the CES included two Attitude Controller Assemblies (ACA), the Rate Gyro Assembly (RGA), the 
Descent Engine Control Assembly (DECA), two Gimbal Drive Actuators (GDA),  and the Ascent Engine Arming 
Assembly (AEAA).
10. Rate Gyro Assembly (RGA)
The RGA supplied the ATCA with damping signals to limit attitude rates and facilitate manual attitude control 
by the crew.
11. Attitude and Translation Control Assembly (ATCA)
When the LM was under PGNS control, the ATCA processed RCS jet commands from the AGC and 
transmitted them to the RCS jets.  Under AGS control, the ATCA processed translation and attitude rate commands 
from the AEA and rate signals from the RGA.  This information was processed in an analog autopilot that issued 
RCS jet commands. 
12. Attitude Controller Assembly (ACA) 
Both LM crew stations were equipped with an attitude hand controller (Figure 11) for manual adjustment of 
LM attitude using RCS thrusters.  The ACA was also used by the commander during landing as part of the Landing 
Point Designator function.  
13. Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly (TTCA) 
Both the commander and pilot stations were equipped with a TTCA (Figure 10). It was used for 3 axis RCS 
translational maneuvers. During DPS firing (normally powered descent) it provided manual lateral (2 axis) 
translation control and throttle control. The TTCA provided better pitch and roll control of the CSM/LM stack than 
the ACA, and was used by the Apollo 13 crew for this reason.
14. Landing Point Designator (LPD) 
The LPD was used by the LM commander to redefine the targeted landing point during the latter phase of 
powered lunar descent. The ACA was also used during the LPD procedure.  LPD scribe marks on the commander’s 
window were used by the Apollo 13 crew to monitor attitude dynamics during PTC rotation and to check the DPS-2 
burn attitude. (Figure 16).  
15. Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI) 
The FDAI (Figure 9) provided a visual display of spacecraft attitude, attitude errors, and rates in the roll, pitch, 
and yaw axes. Both the commander and pilot had an FDAI.  The gimbal lock region of the FDAI ball was red to 
help the crew avoid gimbal lock.
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16. Crewman Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) 
The LM COAS (Figures 8 and 13) could be mounted in one of two positions. The first position was in the LM 
commander’s window. After rendezvous but before docking, the COAS was moved to the overhead docking 
window (above the commander, Figure 13)). This enabled the commander to align the LM with the CSM docking 
target in a CSM rendezvous window. However, the CSM was normally active during docking. Apollo 9 was the 
only Apollo mission during which the LM was active for docking. During Apollo 13, the COAS was used in the 
commander’s window for burn attitude cues (Figure 17).  Celestial sightings could also be performed with the 
COAS for alignment.
17. Rendezvous Radar (RR)
The RR provided measurements of range, range rate, trunnion and shaft angles, and inertial line-of-sight rates 
during rendezvous.  These measurements were sent to the PGNS and crew displays.  The RR was not used during 
the flight of Apollo 13.  However, the RR antenna was rotated by the PGNS, out of the field of view of the AOT to 
permit an IMU alignment check using the Sun, before the DPS-2 burn.
18. Landing Radar (LR)
The LR measured slant range and velocity during powered descent and landing.  The PGNS used this data for 
navigation.  The LR was not used during the flight of Apollo 13.
D. LM Propulsion
The LM had three propulsion systems.  The descent and ascent propulsion systems were independent of each 
other.  The Reaction Control System was used to provide attitude control during ascent and descent engine firings, 
and during coasting flight.  All three propulsion systems used nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl 
hydrazine hypergolic propellants.
1. Descent Propulsion System (DPS) 
The LM DPS consisted of one variable thrust (9,900 pounds maximum) pressure fed engine in the LM descent 
stage.  It was normally used during powered descent.  The Descent Orbit Insertion maneuvers on Apollo 10, Apollo 
11 and Apollo 12 were also executed with the DPS.  If an abort occurred during powered descent the DPS could 
also be used to insert the LM into a safe orbit for a subsequent rendezvous with the CSM.  The DPS could be 
gimbaled by computer or by crew command using the Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly.  It was used for 
three Apollo 13 maneuvers (DPS-1, DPS-2, and MCC-5) after the oxygen tank incident.
2. Ascent Propulsion System (APS)
The APS was a constant thrust (3,500 pounds nominal) pressure fed engine in the LM ascent stage.  On a 
nominal lunar mission the APS was used from lunar lift-off through orbit insertion.  The APS was not gimbaled and 
attitude control during the burn was provided by the LM RCS.  If an abort during powered descent occurred it was 
used to place the LM ascent stage in a safe orbit so that a rendezvous could be conducted.  The APS was not used 
during the flight of Apollo 13.
3. LM Reaction Control System (RCS)
The LM RCS consisted of sixteen 100 lb thrust jets mounted in groups of four on the ascent stage of the LM.  
The RCS provided rotational and translational control for both the combined LM ascent and descent stages and the 
ascent stage alone.  It also performed ullage burns (acceleration along the LM +X axis) to settle propellant before 
ascent and descent engine firings.  The RCS could be commanded by the PGNS, AGS, or manually by the crew.  
An interconnect with the APS propellant system permitted the RCS to burn APS propellant if the APS propellant 
system was pressurized and either the APS or DPS was firing.
During Apollo 13, the LM RCS provided attitude control of the LM/CSM stack for most of the mission 
following the oxygen tank incident.  The MCC-7 trajectory correction and SM separation maneuvers were also 
performed by the LM RCS.
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Appendix B – CSM GNC Architecture
The CSM GNC architecture was composed of two systems, the Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
System (PGNCS) and the Stabilization and Control System (SCS). The PGNCS provided GNC functionality 
during all CSM mission phases.  This included digital autopilot and manual control, absolute navigation, relative 
navigation, entry guidance, burn targeting, and powered flight guidance.  The SCS provided backup flight control.  
Both the PGNCS and SCS possessed independent rotational rate sensors and translational acceleration sensors.  
Both systems supplied commands to the SM RCS, SM SPS, and CM RCS (entry only).
This appendix provides a basic overview of the PGNCS and SCS.  Not all details of CSM GNC design, 
operation, and functionality are addressed.11, 37, 38
A. Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System (PGNCS)
The PGNCS consisted of three subsystems.  The Computer Sub-System (CSS) contained the Command 
Module Computer (CMC) and the Display and Keyboard Panels (DSKY).  The Inertial Sub-System (ISS) consisted 
of a stable member IMU and other supporting electronics.  The Optical Sub-System (OSS) consisted of a sextant 
and scanning telescope used for IMU alignments.  The PGNCS was equipped with a Digital Auto Pilot (DAP) in 
the CMC that provided either automatic or manual crew control of spacecraft attitude.
B. Stabilization and Control System (SCS)
The SCS served as a backup flight control system for the PGNCS. The SCS also served as the interface 
between the PGNCS and the RCS and SPS propulsion systems.  Crew displays such as the FDAI were also 
supported by the SCS.  However, the SCS was not dependent on the PGNCS for flight control functionality.  Unlike 
the PGNCS the SCS did not possess navigation, burn targeting, or guidance functions.  SCS did not have software.
C. CSM GNC Architecture Components
This section details components of the CSM GNC architecture.  Many, but not all, components of the CSM 
GNC architecture were used by the Apollo 13 crew during the mission.  Components not used during the flight of 
Apollo 13 are identified.
1. PGNCS Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
The PGNCS IMU was a three axis IMU identical to the LM primary IMU.  It provided measurements of 
integrated acceleration and integrated rate with respect to an inertial frame to the CMC.  The PGNCS was aligned 
using angular measurements obtained by the sextant.  
2. Sextant
The sextant was a 28 power optical device with a 1.8 degree field of view.  It measured the included angle 
between two lines of sight.  For IMU alignments, star sightings were used.  Star/horizon sightings could be 
performed to support back-up cis-lunar navigation.  The sextant was also used to measure relative line-of-sight 
angles to the LM during rendezvous.
3. Scanning Telescope
The Scanning Telescope was a unity power telescope with a 60 degree field of view.  It was used to locate stars 
for sextant sightings.  It was also used to obtain Lunar landmark sightings for backup orbital navigation.
4. Navigation Base
The IMU, sextant, and scanning telescope were mounted on a navigation base that ensured an accurate, known 
relative alignment between the three units.
5. Minimum Impulse Controller (MIC)
The MIC was located in the CM lower equipment bay, close to the sextant and scanning telescope.  It provided 
fine manual attitude control during sextant and telescope operation by the crew.
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6. Command Module Computer (CMC) or Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC)
The CMC (or AGC) hardware was identical to that of the LGC.  The CMC contained software for absolute and 
relative navigation, IMU alignment, and automatic or manual attitude control of the CSM, CSM/LM, and CSM/LM 
ascent stage.  It also provided burn targeting and burn guidance functions.  In the event of a Saturn Instrumentation 
Unit (IU) failure, during open loop Saturn guidance (first stage and part of second stage), the CMC had software 
that provided automatic guidance commands to the IU.  Once the IU Iterative Guidance Mode was in operation, the 
crew could manually steer the vehicle through the CMC, in the event of an IU failure.  
7. Display and Keyboard Panels (DSKY)
The DSKY permitted the crew to issue commands to the CMC and view CMC data.  One DSKY was located 
on the main control panel.  The other was in the Lower Equipment Bay.  The CSM DSKY differed from the LM 
PGNS DSKY only in caution and status indicators. 
8. Stabilization and Control System (SCS)
The SCS was a backup to the PGNCS to provide rotational and translational control of the vehicle.  The crew 
could switch back and forth between PGNCS and SCS control of the vehicle.  The SCS also provided the interface 
for the PGNCS with the SPS and RCS propulsion systems.  SCS hardware included two Flight Director Attitude 
Indicators (FDAI), one Translational Controller (TC), two Rotational Controllers (RC), a Gimbal Position and Fuel 
Pressure Indicator (GP/FPI), an Attitude Set Control Panel (ASCP), two Gyro Assemblies (GA), a Gyro Display 
Coupler (GDC), Electronic Display Assembly (EDA), Electronic Control Assembly (ECA), Thrust Vector Servo 
Amplifier (TVSA),  and RCS Jet Engine Control (RJEC).
9. Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI) 
Two FDAIs provided a visual display of spacecraft attitude, attitude errors, and rates in the roll, pitch, and yaw 
axes.  Attitude and attitude error from either the PGNCS or SCS could be displayed.  Displayed angular rate data 
was provided by the SCS.  The gimbal lock region of the FDAI ball was colored red to help the crew avoid gimbal 
lock.
10. Entry Monitoring System (EMS)
The EMS was a backup to the PGNCS for entry guidance and was equipped with its own accelerometer.39 It 
provided manual piloting cues and trajectory evaluation data to the crew.  The crew monitored automatic PGNCS 
entry guidance performance with the EMS.  In the event of a PGNCS failure before or during entry, the crew could 
manually fly the entry using the EMS.  The EMS also displayed sensed delta-velocity during powered flight and 
VHF ranging data during rendezvous.  
For example, during transposition and docking the crew monitored sensed delta-velocity displayed on the Entry 
Monitoring System, elapsed time, vehicle attitude, and attitude rates.  However, during transposition and docking 
no measurements of relative range were available for piloting cues. 
11. VHF Ranging
Starting with Apollo 10 VHF ranging provided relative range data to the LM, to supplement relative line-of-
sight data obtained with the sextant.  VHF ranging was not used on Apollo 13.
12. Crewman Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) 
The COAS (Figure 8) provided lateral and angular alignment cues to the CM pilot during final approach and 
docking.  
D. CSM and CM Propulsion
The CSM had three propulsion systems.  The Service Propulsion System was used for large orbit adjustment 
burns.  The Service Module Reaction Control System provided attitude control for the CSM and CSM/LM 
configurations.  The Command Module Reaction Control System provided attitude control of the CM from SM 
separation just before EI and during re-entry.  
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1. Service Propulsion System (SPS)
The SPS was a gimbaled 20,500 lbs constant thrust engine.  The SCS gimbaled the engine to align the thrust 
vector with the vehicle center of mass.  The SPS used nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine 
hypergolic propellants.  
2. Service Module Reaction Control System (SM RCS)
Four groups (called quads) of four 100 lbs thrust RCS jets were distributed around the SM at 90 degrees 
(Figure 1).  Each quad had its own propellant tanks.  The SM RCS used nitrogen tetroxide and mono-methyl 
hydrazine hypergolic propellants.
3. Command Module Reaction Control System (CM RCS)
The CM possessed two independent RCS systems each having six 93 lb thrust RCS jets.  These systems were 
only used for attitude control during re-entry.  The CM RCS used nitrogen tetroxide and mono-methyl hydrazine 
hypergolic propellants.
Appendix C – Acronyms
ACA – Attitude Controller Assembly
AGS – Abort Guidance Section
ALSEP – Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package
APS – Auxiliary Propulsion System
AOT – Alignment Optical Telescope
ASA – Abort Sensor Assembly 
CCS – Command and Communication System
CECO – Center Engine Cut-Off
CES – Control Electronics Section
CM – Command Module
CMC – Command Module Computer
COAS – Crewman Optical Alignment Sight
CSM – Command Service Module
CST – Central Standard Time
DAP – Digital Auto Pilot
DOI – Descent Orbit Insertion
DPS – Descent Propulsion System
DSKY – Display and Keyboard 
EI – Entry Interface
EMS – Entry Monitoring System
EST – Eastern Standard Time
EVA – Extra Vehicular Activity
FDAI – Flight Director Attitude Indicator
GET – Ground Elapsed Time
GLFC – Graphite LM Fuel Cask
GNC – Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GN&CS – Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
IGM – Iterative Guidance Mode
IMU – Inertial Measurement Unit
IU – Instrumentation Unit
L/D – Lift to Drag Ratio
LM – Lunar Module
LOI – Lunar Orbit Insertion
LPD – Landing Point Designator
MCC – Mid-Course Correction
MPAD – Mission Planning and Analysis Division
MSFN – Manned Space Flight Network
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OECO – Out-board Engine Cut-Off
ORDEAL – Orbital Rate Display – Earth and Lunar 
PC – Peri-Cynthion
PDI – Powered Descent Initiation
PGNCS – Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
PGNS – Primary Guidance and Navigation Section
PTC – Passive Thermal Control
RCS – Reaction Control System
REFSMMAT – Reference Stable Member Matrix
RTCC – Real Time Computer Complex
SM – Service Module
SPS – Service Propulsion System
TEI – Trans Earth Injection
TLI – Trans Lunar Injection
TTCA – Thrust/Translation Controller Assembly
USB – Unified S-Band
USS – United States Ship
VHF – Very High Frequency
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System integrity questionable.  CM 
battery power conserved for entry.  
CM GNC not available until entry 
due to power.
LM used as lifeboat until re-entry.  
LM GNC and propulsion used for 
return to Earth and attitude control. 
Limited power available for LM GNC.
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Simplified Lunar Module GNC Architecture
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Post Incident Challenges
Maintaining attitude control in presence of Service Module oxygen 
venting.
Solar illuminated debris from Service Module prevented star 
identification needed for normal IMU star alignments.
Docked transfer alignment of 
Lunar Module IMU.
Frequency conflict between 
Lunar Module and S-IVB 
S-Band transponders 
complicated ground 
tracking for ~6 hours. 
S-IVB Trajectory
S-IVB Impact
(77:46 GET)
CSM/LM 
Trajectory
To Sun
To Earth
LOI (77:25 GET)
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Re-Establish Return to Earth Trajectory
Direct return or Lunar fly-by?
Choice of return time and location.  Pacific, Atlantic, or Indian Ocean?
Ensure Lunar Module consumables margin to support safe return.
Jettison Service Module or keep it until just before re-entry?
Lunar fly-by chosen.
Indian Ocean splashdown with option to change to Pacific and speed 
up return after lunar fly-by.
Service Module kept attached to Command Module due to thermal 
concerns.
Page 7
DPS-1 Burn
Executed ~5.5 hours after incident.
Spacecraft now on return trajectory for Indian Ocean landing at ~152 
hours.
Both PGNS and AGS powered for the burn.
PGNS kept powered up until next burn 2 hours after lunar fly-by.
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Passive Thermal Control Rotation Challenge
Flight Director Attitude 
Indicator powered off. 
Crew used computer display 
to establish rotation & avoid 
IMU gimbal lock. 
axis of 
rotation
Attitude Hand 
Controller (yaw)
Thrust & Translation
Hand Controller (roll
and pitch)
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Shorten Return and Move Landing to Pacific
More recovery forces available in the Pacific than in the Indian Ocean.
Splashdown at ~143 hours provided ~13 hours margin in Lunar Module 
consumables.
PGNS alignment performed at Lunar Module activation still accurate 
enough for DPS-2 burn.
DPS-2 (PC+2) burn successfully executed using PGNS.
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Passive Thermal Control Rotation
No telemetry for Mission Control 
monitoring of rotation.
Crew reported Earth and Moon crossing
of Landing Point Designator to Mission
Control.
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MCC-5 Burn to Correct Entry Conditions
Predicted flight path angle at EI trending to smaller values.
Mid-Course Correction (MCC) burns required to ensure proper EI flight 
path angle.
PGNS and AGS powered off since PC+2 burn.
AGS used for MCC-5 since it used less power than PGNS.
Contingency procedure required to place Lunar Module at burn attitude
and perform AGS body axis align.
Sun illuminated debris prevent Alignment Optical Telescope sightings 
on stars for IMU alignment.
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Body Axis Alignment Procedure
Contingency procedure developed before Apollo 8.
Earth in COAS for retrograde or posigrade correction burns.  For retrograde Sun 
then positioned in Alignment Optical Telescope to achieve pitch attitude.
AGS body axis align then performed.
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MCC-5 Execution
Burn performed manually due to AGS accelerometer performance concerns due to
exposure to low temperatures (unheated).
AGS controlled yaw automatically.
Crew controlled pitch and roll using cues from Attitude Indicator error needles.
Roll controlled with Thrust & Translation Hand Controller. 
Pitch controlled with Thrust & Translation Hand Controller. 
Burn terminated with cue from watch.
Thrust & Translation
Hand Controllers
Attitude 
Indicator
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Pre-Entry Crew Timeline Challenging
EI-7
.
SM sep & 
photos
• LM closeout
• Docking tunnel 
vented to 2.2 psi.
Begin CM 
power-up 
CM IMU 
align 
• LM Sep.
• Maneuver 
to entry attitude.
• IMU align check
Crew enters 
nominal entry 
timeline.
Entry 
Interface
Entry Data 
Uplink
MCC-7
LM 
PGNS
align
AGS 
align
Begin LM 
power-up
EI-1
EI-3
EI-5
EI-9
Start staggered 
crew rest. 
Staggered
crew rest 
complete.
EI-11
EI-13EI-15
AGS 
align
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MCC-7 Burn to Adjust EI Flight Path Angle
Both PNGS and AGS powered due to margin in power and consumables.
AGS alignment, PGNS alignment from AGS, then PGNS Sun/Moon align.
AGS used for burn due to PGNS RCS propellant consumption.
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Thrust & Translation
Hand Controllers
Attitude 
Indicator
MCC-7 Execution
Same manual AGS procedure used for MCC-5.
AGS controlled yaw automatically.
Crew controlled pitch and roll using cues from Attitude Indicator error needles.
Roll controlled with Thrust & Translation Hand Controller. 
Pitch controlled with Thrust & Translation Hand Controller. 
Burn terminated with cue from watch.
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Service Module Separation
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Lunar Module Separation
LM RCS jets not used for separation.
CM RCS jets for entry attitude control 
only.
Docking tunnel vented to 2.2 psi to 
provide sep ∆V of ~ 2 ft/sec.
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Lunar Module Separation Attitude
Desired Attitude Actual Attitude
To Earth
North
Side of
Orbit
South
Side of
Orbit
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Lunar Module Separation
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Re-Entry
Crew entered nominal entry 
checklist at EI-20 minutes.
Pre-EI sextant and Moon 
checks indicated good 
IMU alignment.
Odyssey splashed down ~1 
nm from the target point.  
Entry GNC performance 
good even though Command 
Module IMU was unheated for 
~80 hours.
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Challenges That Apollo 13 Did Not Face
Continuous bad or loss of communications.
Physical damage to GNC hardware.
Software anomalies.
Absence of these problems was a factor in the successful return of the 
crew.
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Observations on Apollo 13
Ground support is essential.
Spacecraft recovery with limited systems functionality may be required.
New or modified plans and procedures are required.
Clearly define the problems to be solved.
Procedural errors add risk and should be avoided.
Ensure good air-to-ground communication and manage the crew work 
load.
Mitigating risk of development does not always mitigate operational risk.
Orbital lighting conditions challenge humans and electro-optical sensors.
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Questions
